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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1. Context to the problem of identifying the carrier under a bill of lading 
containing a demise clause and/or identity of carrier clause  
Contracts of affreightment, in one form or another govern most maritime trade agreements. 
They are contracts  by which a shipowner or an agent makes an undertaking either to carry 
goods by sea,  or to provide a vessel for such a purpose. A contract of affreightment may take 
various forms; the most common of which are charterparties, and contracts evidenced by a 
bill of lading. There are three main types of charterparties: voyage charterparties, time 
charterparties and demise charterparties.  
For the purposes of this paper, we will look at the time charterparty. The time charterparty is 
a contract between a charterer and a shipowner or demise charterer for the exclusive use of 
cargo carrying space on board a vessel for a fixed period of time.1 Where a vessel is under 
time charter, it frequently occurs that a cargo interest will find difficulty in identifying the 
correct party as the carrier when instituting action for loss or damage to cargo. 
For the purposes of determining the identity of the carrier, the bill of lading has traditionally 
been of first importance. The issue in identifying the carrier under a bill of lading occurs 
where there is a conflict in the indicators, namely the stamped or printed words added by 
parties at the time of issuing the bill of lading, the pre-printed terms on the standard form 
such as the demise clause on the reverse side of the bill and; the mode of signature.2 A bill of 
lading not clearly stipulating who the carrier is, leads to uncertainty as to who must be sued 
as carrier under the contract of carriage.3 This uncertainty results in cargo interests being 
forced to sue both the shipowner and the charterer or any other party who may fit the role of 
carrier, resulting in a multiplicity of unnecessary litigation and additional expenses incurred.4 
 
 
                                                            
1
 Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009) 588. 
2
 R Aikens… et al Bills of Lading 1 ed (2006) 140. 
3
 N Gaskell…et al Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts 1 ed (2000) 83. 
4
 Gaskell (note 3 above; 85). 
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1.2. The bill of lading issued pursuant to a time charterparty agreement 
Where cargo has been loaded on a time-chartered vessel, a distinction must be made between 
the contract of carriage and the time charter.5 The time charter is the contract concluded 
between the charterer and the shipowner or demise charterer “for the use of carrying capacity 
on board the vessel for a specified period of time”,6 whereas the contract of carriage is a 
contract concluded between the shipper and carrier to carry the goods.7 
 
Under a time charterparty, bills of lading may be signed on behalf of the shipowner or on 
behalf of the charterer.8 A vessel that is time chartered is under the control of both the 
shipowner and the charterer. The shipowner is responsible for the navigational control of the 
vessel9 while the charterer controls the commercial and earning exploits of the vessel.10 Here, 
the shipowner carries out the voyage pursuant to the time charterer’s orders.11 This indicates 
that the voyage of the vessel is performed in keeping with the shipowner’s responsibility to 
the charterer pursuant to (a) the time charterparty agreement, and (b) the charterer’s 
responsibility to the shipper for the carriage of goods.12 In addition, the terms of the 
charterparty between the shipowner and the time charterer will have no bearing on the 
relationship between the shipper and the carrier unless these terms have been expressly 
included in the bill of lading contract.13 
 
1.3. Background to the problem of identifying the carrier under a bill of lading 
containing a demise clause  
1.3.1. What is the demise clause? 
The demise clause provides that the voyage charterer or time charterer having issued a bill of 
lading is not a party to the contract of carriage evidenced by such bill of lading, and therefore 
cannot be held as the carrier in terms of national or international legislation.14 The clause is 
                                                            
5
 C Pejovic ‘The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of Law (2000) 31 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 379, at 380. 
6
 R Force …et al Admiralty and Maritime law (2004) Federal Judicial Center 52. 
7
 Pejovic C (note 5 above; 380). 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Force (note 6 above; 52).  
10
 Whistler International Ltd v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (The Hill Harmony), 2001 A.C.1 638 (2001). 
11
 Pejovic C (note 5 above; 381). 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 J F Wilson Carriage of Goods by Sea 7 ed (2010) 7. 
14
 W Tetley ‘The Demise of the Demise Clause’ (1998) 44 McGill Law Journal 807, at 810. 
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said to perform two functions: firstly “it is a positive attempt to fix the shipowner with 
liability under the contract; [and] secondly, it removes a potential liability of a charterer.”15 
The demise clause is ordinarily phrased in the following terms: 
“If the ship is not owned or chartered by demise to the company or line by whom this 
bill of lading is issued (as may be the case notwithstanding anything which appears to 
the contrary) the bill of lading shall take effect as a contract with the owner or demise 
charterer, as the case may be, as principal made through the agency of the said 
company or line who act as agents only and shall be under no personal liability 
whatsoever in respect thereof.” 
 
1.3.2. Origin of the demise clause; purpose for its incorporation in bills of lading; 
whether the purpose continues to exist in contemporary shipping trade 
The origin of the demise clause may be found in early 20th century English jurisprudence.16 
Prior to the existence of the demise clause, under English law - section 503 of the unamended 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 only a shipowner was permitted to limit liability,17 whilst 
charterers were effectively excluded from the limitation of liability under the Act.18 
According to section 503 of the 1894 Act, where damage or loss had been caused to cargo on 
board a vessel, a claim against the shipowner might be reduced, whereas a claim against a 
charterer might succeed for the total amount of damages proved.19 This principle was 
illustrated in the 1922 case of Paterson, Zochonis v. Elder, Dempster.20 In this case, the 
charterers were held “fully liable for cargo loss” while the shipowners were excluded from 
liability in terms of section 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894. South African law 
mirrored the English law position by enacting section 261 of the Merchant Shipping Act21 
which allowed only shipowners to limit liability against loss or damage caused to cargo. 
It became increasingly necessary for charterers to clarify that they were not the contracting 
carriers and that cargo interests ought to sue shipowners as contracting carriers.22 Time 
charterers therefore began to include the demise clause in their bills of lading which gave 
effect to a contract of carriage between the shipowner and holders of bills of lading for goods 
                                                            
15
 Gaskell (note 3 above; 104). 
16
 R W Pritchett ‘The demise Clause in American Courts’ 1980 Lloyd’s Mar. & Com. LQ 387, at 387 
17
 Gaskell (note 3 above; 103). 
18
 Pritchett R W (note 16 above; 387). 
19
 Gaskell (note 3 above; 103). 
20
 (1922) 12 Lloyds 1. Law Rep. 69 
21
 Act 57 of 1951 
22
 Gaskell (note 3 above; 104). 
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carried on board a time-chartered vessel.23 This was the original purpose for which the 
demise clause had been created.24 
With the demise clause in place, it was envisaged that cargo interests would sue shipowners 
for loss or damage to goods. The shipowner would in turn rely on the indemnity from the 
charterer in terms of the charterparty agreement.25  
Section 71 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1906 included demise charterers in the category 
of persons entitled to limit liability. This statutory limitation of liability was later extended to 
all charterers by Article 6 of the 1957 Limitation Convention. The provision was enacted in 
the Merchant Shipping Act of 1958, thereby causing the demise clause to become redundant 
in its purpose.26  Article 1(2) of the 1976 Limitation Convention also makes provision for this 
limitation of liability, which is now enacted in Schedule 7 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 
1995. In 1981, South African law followed suit by adding section 263 to the South African 
Merchant Shipping Act, extending the limitation of liability to charterers, managers, 
operators and persons possessing a ship. However, despite this change in legislation, 
charterers have failed to remove the demise clause from their bills of lading. Most liner bills 
of lading persist with inclusion of demise clauses on the reverse side of the bill. 
Cargo interests may find procedural benefits in holding the shipowner liable in order to arrest 
the vessel as security for their claim, however difficulties may arise if the  cargo interests 
lacks knowledge of the contractual terms for chartering the vessel.27 Also, cargo interests 
often view the face of the bill to ascertain who the carrier is. With the demise clause carefully 
tucked away on the reverse side of the bill, difficulties arise in identifying the carrier and 
proper defendant to a cargo claim.28 
 
 
 
                                                            
23
 Pritchett R W (note 16 above; 388). 
24
 Gaskell (note 3 above; 104). 
25
 Pritchett R W (note 16 above; 388). 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Gaskell (note 3 above; 105). 
28
 Gaskell (note 3 above; 105). 
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1.4. Statement of purpose and rationale of research paper 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the role of the demise clause and/or identity of 
carrier under a bill of lading in determining the identity of the carrier. It examines the 
conflicting approaches taken by English Courts, American Courts and Canadian Courts, 
regarding the validity and effectiveness of the demise clause and the identity of carrier clause. 
Many courts and scholars regard the demise clause as contravening Article 3(8) of the Hague-
Visby Rules, on the grounds that  that such a clause is used as a mechanism by a charterer 
who has entered into a contract of carriage with a shipper to lessen or exonerate himself of 
carrier liability. However, other courts have viewed the demise clause and the identity of 
carrier clause as confirming the common law principle that a contract of carriage is between 
the shipper and the shipowner. 
The lack of uniformity in judicial decisions regarding the applicability of the demise clause 
and identity of carrier clause has led to extensive debate amongst scholars. It has become 
increasingly necessary to analyse the courts’ reasonings in  determining who is the carrier 
under a bill of lading that contains a demise and/or identity of carrier clause. Also, on an 
international level, international uniform law has failed to provide clear direction in 
determining this question. This being the case, there is the increasing need to establish 
uniformity under domestic legislation, and in judicial decisions and international rules.  
This dissertation also examines the concept of “carrier” under international conventions and 
in domestic legislation, and analyses the complexities arising from conflicting approaches. 
Some courts have rigidly held on to the single carrier approach whilst other courts have 
extended the concept of “carrier” to include a multiplicity of parties.29 The multicarrier 
approach has been accepted by some courts as affording certainty to a cargo interest that he 
will recover from an actual carrier or from the contracting carrier, since many parties are 
involved in the shipment of goods.30 
 
1.5. Key Research Questions 
1. Chapter two of this dissertation details the various indicators in a bill of lading 
according to which the carrier under the bill of lading may be identified. The  chapter 
                                                            
29
 V Rochester The Lone “Carrier” An Analysis of the Implications of the General Reluctance to Hold Parties 
Involved in Sea Carriage Jointly and Severally Liable (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2005) 
108-109. 
30
 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part IV)” (1976) 7 JMLC 615, at 
630. 
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discusses the issue of how the contractual carrier may be identified where the 
indicators conflict with each other, and in such a case which of these indicators (the 
signature on the bill, the attestation clause, the heading of the bill, the definitions 
clause, and the demise clause/identity of carrier clause); must be given precedence in 
determining the carrier. 
2. Chapter two sets out the definition of the term “carrier” in terms of international rules 
particularly the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules, and discusses whether 
under these Rules there can be more than one carrier  against whom a cargo claimant 
may properly institute action. 
3.  Chapter two also examines whether the demise clause and identity of carrier clause 
can be seen as an exemption clause in conflict with Article 3(8) of the Hague-Visby 
Rules. The chapter examines international law and scholarly opinions to determine 
whether it is appropriate to regard the demise clause as a mechanism that a charterer 
may use to avoid liability as a cargo carrier, thereby directing cargo suits instead to a 
shipowner.  
4. Chapter three undertakes a comparative analysis of the judicial decisions traditionally 
taken by English Courts and the current position taken by the House of Lords in The 
Starsin31 together with the criticisms surrounding the judgement, to determine the 
validity and effectiveness of the demise clause and the identity of carrier clause in 
identifying the carrier under a bill of lading in English courts. 
5. Chapter four examines case authority regarding the validity of the demise clause in 
American Courts, noting the lack of uniformity in case law on this issue. The chapter 
also looks at the theory of joint and several liability between a shipowner and 
charterer as a means to determine who is the carrier/s to a contract of carriage and to 
prevent an exemption of liability by charterers. 
6. Chapter five discusses the traditional approach adopted by Canadian Courts on the 
validity of the demise clause and analyses the approach currently adopted to 
determine the validity and effect of the demise clause in a bill of lading when 
identifying the carrier. The chapter also examines previous and current approaches 
adopted by Canadian Courts on the application of the joint venture theory to a 
contract of carriage as posited by Professor Tetley. 
                                                            
31
 Homburg Houtimport BV v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin), 2003 U.K.H.L. 12, 2004 A.C.1 715 (2003). 
7 
 
7. Chapter six examines the contractual interpretive process adopted in the United 
Kingdom, and the way in which this approach has influenced the interpretation of 
bills of ladings where third party reliances are a factor for consideration, as in cases 
such as The Starsin.32  
8. Chapter six will also look at the development of the contractual interpretative process 
in South Africa up to its culmination in the current approach adopted in Natal Joint 
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality.33 
9. Finally, Chapter six  looks at the South African action in rem. The chapter considers 
what influential effects the approaches taken by English, American and Canadian 
Courts in identifying the carrier may have on a claimant seeking to enforce a maritime 
claim by way of an action in rem in a South African Court exercising its admiralty 
jurisdiction. 
 
                                                            
32
 The Starsin supra note 31 at 588 para 73. 
33
 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA). 
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Chapter Two: Methods of identifying the carrier 
  
2.1.  Introduction  
The issue of the identity of the carrier question has a long and contentious history. While a 
bill of lading may define the contracting carrier, there is in various instances still real doubt 
as to who is the carrier under a bill of lading.1  As noted  in the introductory chapter, the issue 
in identifying the carrier under a bill of lading arises where there is a conflict in the 
indicators, these being the stamped or printed words added by the parties at the time of 
issuing the bill of lading, the pre-printed terms on the standard form such as the demise 
clause on the reverse side of the bill and, the mode of signature.2 When a  bill of lading does 
not clearly stipulate who the carrier is, uncertainty3 can arise as to who must be sued as 
carrier under the contract of carriage.4 
This chapter  analyses the various different indicators contained in a bill of lading. The 
chapter will also look at extrinsic evidence such as for whom the bill of lading had been 
issued. Lastly, the chapter will examine the definition of the carrier under the Hague and 
Hague-Visby Rules as well as under the Hamburg Rules, and the possibility of there being 
more than one carrier to a contract of carriage. The different approaches to the interpretation 
of bills of lading that have been taken in case law, relating particularly to the treatment of the 
demise clause are discussed in subsequent chapters.  
 
2.2.  Conflicting indicators on the bill of lading  
2.2.1.  The attestation clause 
The face of a standard liner bill of lading contains an attestation clause which typically reads;  
“In witness whereof, the master or agent of the said vessel has signed three bills of 
lading, all of this tenor and date, and if one is accomplished, the other shall be void.”5 
 
Historically, once a vessel had departed from the port of shipment, the master had full 
authority to act on behalf of the carrier who was ordinarily the shipowner. The attestation 
clause reflects this by indicating that it is the master who would have issued bills of lading in 
respect of cargo received on board the vessel. Ordinarily those bills of lading would bind the 
                                                            
1
 N Gaskell…et al Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts 1 ed (2000) 83. 
2
 R Aikens… et al Bills of Lading 1 ed (2006) 140. 
3
 Gaskell (note 1 above; 83). 
4
 Ibid 85. 
5
 The Berkshire [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 185 (Q.B.) 
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shipowner as carrier. Where the vessel is chartered by demise, the master is employed by the 
demise charterer and in this situation the master’s signature on the bill of lading would bind 
the demise charterer. It was the master who was given charge of all day to day operations 
happening on the vessel due to the vessel’s “distance from physical control on the shore.”6  
In modern shipping, the master remains responsible for ensuring proper performance of the 
vessel for the owner’s business and must carry out his functions accurately and in keeping 
with the terms of the charterparty.7 
Under a time charterparty, the master and crew are employees of the shipowner and must 
fulfil the shipowner’s orders in regard to of the navigational management of the vessel. The 
master is required to perform all functions as per the charterparty agreement in the manner set 
out in the charterparty.8 However, he is not responsible for the commercial control of the 
vessel and does not “fix the vessel or look after the cargo”9 on board. 
In terms of English law, the master is responsible for undertaking the charterer’s instructions 
in terms of the charterparty. However this is not indicative of a relationship between the 
master and the charterer.10  Gaskell states that, “[c]harterparties are examples of contracts in 
which one party, the charterer; is entitled to exercise some control over the conduct of an 
employee of the other party, the shipowner.”11 The master is the servant of the shipowner 
even when fulfilling instructions of the charterer, and by so doing, the master fulfils the 
shipowner’s duty in terms of the time charter.12 
The standard Gentime and the NYPE 2015 forms make provision for the “charterer’s right to 
give orders to the master.” Gentime clause 12, paragraph 1 states that: 
“The Master… shall at all times during the currency of this Charter Party be under the 
orders and directions of the Charterers as regards employment, agency or other 
arrangements. The Master shall prosecute all voyages with due dispatch” 
                                                            
6
 N Lopez ‘The master’s role in charter performance’ (1991) 8 Australia & New Zealand Mar. Law Journal 3 at 
3. 
7
 Ibid 4. 
8
 Lopez N (note 6 above; 4). 
9
 Lopez N (note 6 above; 4). 
10
 C Pejovic ‘The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of Law (2000) 
31 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 379 at 382. 
11
 Gaskell N ‘Charterers’ Liability to Shipowner-Orders, Indemnities and Vessel Damage’ (2003) J. Schelin (ed.) 
Modern Law of Charterparties at 3-4. 
12
 Pejovic C (note 10 above; 383). 
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Further, NYPE 2015 clause 8(a) provides that: 
“The Master shall perform the voyages with due despatch and shall render all 
customary assistance with the Vessel’s crew. The Master… shall be under the orders 
and directions of the Charterers as regards employment and agency”13 
These clauses stipulate that while the master is employed by the shipowner and is responsible 
for serving the shipowner’s interests, he is also obliged to carry out the instructions of the 
charterer and to provide assistance to the charterer during the time charter period.14 Taking 
into account the role of the master; the factual inquiry as to who employs the master is thus a 
critical issue. Rix J in The Starsin15 spoke of “the general preference in English law for 
owner’s bills” causing a court to be wary in holding liable as carrier anyone else other than 
the shipowner.16 
 
2.2.2.  Signature on the bill of lading  
2.2.2 (a).  Signature by the Master 
Common law authorizes the master to sign bills of lading for the shipowner.17 The master is 
the employee of the shipowner and as such will have either implied, actual or ostensible 
authority to sign bills of lading for the owner.18 For this reason, it is common practice for the 
master’s signature on bills of lading19  to bind the shipowner, provided that the master signed 
within the ambit of his general authority.20 An exception to this general rule would be where 
the vessel had been demise chartered. In the case of a demise charter, the demise charterer 
                                                            
13
 P Alstergren The Charterer’s Right to Order the Master (unpublished LLM thesis, 2002) at 23. 
14
 Ibid 21. 
15
 Homburg Houtimport BV v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) 2001 Lloyd's Rep. 1 437 (2001). 
16
 The Starsin supra [2001] note 15 at 448 para 49. 
17
 M T Reilly ‘Identity of the Carrier: Issues Under Slot Charters’ (2001) 25 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 505, at 
507. 
18
 Clifford Chance ‘An agent’s authority to sign bills of lading’ Maritime Review 6 May 1998 (Available at 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjv74
ayib_bAhUkJsAKHYlTDTAQFggoMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ukpandi.com%2Fknowledge-
publications%2Farticle%2Fan-agents-authority-to-sign-bills-of-lading-
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acquires full possession and control of the vessel and the master becomes the agent or 
employee of the charterer.21 
In addition, all standard time charterparties make provision for “the charterer to order the 
master to sign bills of lading without prejudice to the charterparty between the shipowner and 
the charterer.”22 The employment clause contained in the time charter stipulating that the 
master “will sign bills of lading as presented by the charterer” 23 indicates that the master 
enters into a contract with the shipper on behalf of the shipowner “for the benefit of the 
charterer.”24 As such, the master’s authority to sign bills of lading is not derived from the 
charterer, but rather from the shipowner.25  
An example of such a clause is found in the standard Gentime form in which clause 17 states 
that:  
“(a)(i)  The Master shall sign bills of lading or waybills as presented in conformity 
with mate’s receipts…” 
 
 
The NYPE 2015 form26 contains a similar provision in clause 31 which states that: 
 
“(a)  The Master shall sign the bills of lading or waybills for cargo as presented in 
conformity with mates or tally clerk’s receipts” 
“(b)  All bills of lading or waybills shall be without prejudice to this Charter Party 
and the Charterers shall indemnify the Owners against all consequences or 
liabilities which may arise from any inconsistency between this Charter Party 
and any bills of lading or waybills signed by… the Master at their request.” 
In the case of The Berkshire27, Brandon J held that the effect of a clause in a charterparty 
allowing a charterer to order the master to sign bills of lading as presented is “well settled.”28 
It was held; 
“In the first place, the clause entitles the charterers to present to the master for 
signature by him on behalf of the shipowners bills of lading which contain or 
                                                            
21
 Ibid 194. 
22
 D G S Chong ‘Unravelling the Identity of the Carrier’ (1994) 6 SAcLJ 182 at 185. 
23
 Smidt v. Tiden, (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 446; I R. Colinvaux, Carver's Carriage by Sea § 707 (13th ed. 
1982). 
24
 Smidt v. Tiden, (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 446; I R. Colinvaux, Carver's Carriage by Sea § 707 (13th ed. 
1982). 
25
Pejovic C (note 10 above; 383). 
26
 NYPE 2015 (Available at https:// www.bimco.org%2F-%2Fmedia%2Fbimco%2Ftraining%2Fcourse-
programmes%2Felearning%2Fnype2015) 
27
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evidence contracts between the shippers of the goods and the shipowners, provided 
always that such bills of lading do not contain extraordinary terms or terms 
inconsistent with the charter-party; and the master is obliged, on presentation to him 
of such bills of lading, to sign them on the shipowner’s behalf.” 29 
 
In the case of Manchester Trust v. Furness,30  the shipowners chartered their vessel to the 
charterers, which charterparty contained terms stating that; 
"the captain and crew, although paid by the owners, shall be the agents and servants 
of the charterers for all purposes .... In signing bills of lading it is expressly agreed 
that the captain shall only do so as agent for the charterers."  
 
The bill of lading referred to the charterparty but did not incorporate its terms. It was signed 
by the master without any qualification as to the capacity in which he did so. In a claim for 
cargo damage against the shipowners, it was held that though the cargo interests knew of the 
existence of the charterparty, they did not know of its terms. As such the shipowners were 
held to be bound by their master's signature. The charterparty further provided that the 
charterers were to “indemnify the owners from all consequences and liabilities that may arise 
from the captain signing the bills of lading.” This was held to support the contention that the 
Master had authority to sign on behalf of and to bind the shipowner. 
 
However, bills of lading signed by the master, or the charterer by the authority of the master, 
may not always bind shipowners.31 It may be agreed between the shipowner and the charterer 
in terms of the charterparty that a bill of lading signed by the master shall be binding on the 
charterer alone.32 In such case, if the bill signed by the master indicates in writing or in 
printed terms that he has signed “for and on behalf of the charterer”, the bill will be binding 
on the charterer, provided that the master had authority to sign for the charterer.33 
 
2.2.2 (b).  Signature by charterers on the Master’s behalf  
The master is at liberty to expressly delegate authority to sign bills of lading or such authority 
may be impliedly derived from the terms of the charterparty.34 Some standard charterparties 
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make provision for the charterer or its agent to sign bills of lading on behalf of the Master 
35as is the case in the NYPE form.36  
Clause 31 in the NYPE 2015 provides: 
(a) “…the Charterers or their agents may sign bills of lading or waybills on behalf 
of the Master, with the Owners’/Master’s prior written authority, always in 
conformity with mates’ receipts.”37 
In addition, clause 31(b) goes on to state that;  
(b) “…the Charterers shall indemnify the Owners against all consequences or 
liabilities which may arise from any inconsistency between this Charter Party 
and any bills of lading or waybills signed by the Charterers or their agents or 
by the Master at their request”38  
By way of such an indemnity clause, shipowners safeguard themselves against liabilities by 
virtue of the charterer’s signature which outweigh those to which they are exposed in the 
charterparty.39 These clauses may be express or implied.40 Where there is an implied 
indemnity provision in terms of a charterparty, caution must be taken when ascertaining 
where and when indemnity exists.41 
It follows that the charterer may “present the bill to the master to sign” or he may “short 
circuit”42 the process by signing the bill himself.43 In The Berkshire,44 Clause 8 of the NYPE 
time charter provided for the master “to sign Bills of lading… as presented, in conformity 
with Mate’s or Tally Clerks’ Receipts.”45 Brandon J in considering clause 8 held that; 
whether charterers sign bills of lading for themselves or present them to the master for 
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signature, the “signature binds the shipowners as principals to the contract contained in or 
evidenced by the bills of lading.”46 
It is generally presumed that when chartering on time, the charterer or his agent may sign 
bills of lading for the master or shipowner evidencing a contract of carriage between the 
shipowner and holder of the bill of lading.47 Channel J upheld this stance in Tillmans & Co. v 
S.S Knutsford Ltd,48 where the charterparty contained a clause providing that the master was 
to be under the charterer’s order and directions as well as an indemnity clause extending to 
the master signing bills of lading as presented by the time charterers or their agents. The 
master’s signature appeared on three bills under the printed words “For Captain and Owners” 
as directed by the time charterers.49 The charterers however signed a fourth bill of lading 
under the words “For the Captain and Owners.”50 Here, the Court upheld the charterer’s 
authority to sign. Channel J held that: 
“If [the time charterers] had struck out the words “for the captain and owners”, and 
then signed [the bill of lading], I think they would, on the face of it, have been 
purporting to make it their own contract. They purported to sign it for the captain and 
owners; and therefore, to make it the contract of the captain and owners, and they had 
absolute power to do that by the terms of the charterparty.”51  
 
This principle was further established in The Rewia52 in which case the Court of Appeal held 
that in the case of a charterparty other than a demise charter, where the master signs a bill of 
lading without qualification, he signs as agent of the shipowner.53 As such the contract of 
carriage evidenced by the bill of lading is between the shipowner as principal and holder of 
the bill of lading.54 
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2.2.2 (c).  Signature by sub-charterers or charterer’s agents on the Master’s behalf  
Within the shipping industry, it is common practice for a shipowner or demise charterer to 
charter a vessel and subsequently for such charterer to sub-charter the vessel.55 Vessels are 
often subjected to many successive charterparties and these charter agreements are widely 
known for its commercial convenience and popularity.56 Within this framework of 
charterparties, each charterer and/or sub-charterer is known to be a disponent owner.57 
Some light was shed on the term “disponent owner” in O/Y Wasa S.S. Co. Ltd. & Anor. v. 
Newspaper Pulp & Wood Export Ltd.58 In this case, it was held that; 
“It would presumably cover a time charterer. It covers someone who can dispose of a 
ship without being the owner of the ship, for the ‘disponent owner’ must be different 
from the owner.”59 
 
Where a charterer is authorised to sign a bill of lading on the master’s behalf, provided that 
the bill of lading is not “manifestly inconsistent”60 with the terms of the charterparty or 
provide for “extraordinary terms”,61 it is generally accepted that authority to sign the bill may 
be delegated without any limitation.62 It has been accepted that once the charterer’s authority 
to issue a bill of lading has been established, the act of signing the bill becomes a mere 
“ministerial act”63 which may not be performed personally.64 As such, charterers may request 
their agents or sub-charterers to sign on their behalf.65  
In the Vikfrost66 the issue raised was one of delegating authority to sub-charterers to sign bills 
of lading. The charterparty in this case stated that: 
“The master ... shall be under the orders and directions of the charterers ... The master 
to sign bills of lading as presented. The charterers to indemnify the owners against all 
consequences and liabilities which may arise from the master signing such bills of 
lading ... It is agreed that bills of lading issued for voyages under this charterparty 
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may be signed on behalf of the master by the charterer's agents and may contain the 
demise clause.”67 
 
The charterparty also made provision for the charterers to sublet the ship which the charterers 
subsequently did.68 The sub-charter also provided for the master to be under “the orders of 
the charterers as regards employment, agency… the charterers to indemnify the owners 
against all consequences and liabilities arising from the master, officers or agents signing 
bills of lading…”69  
Bills of lading had been issued in respect of the cargo and sub-charterers’ agents signed “for 
the master.”70 The bills were governed by English law and contained an identity of carrier 
clause. In this case, the shipowner argued that the sub charterers’ agents were not authorised 
to sign the bills of lading for the master and that bills containing an English jurisdiction 
clause limited their authority to sign.71 The Commercial Court and the Court of Appeal 
dismissed these arguments and held: 
“(i) that the head charter authorised the charterers both to issue bills of lading and to 
sublet the vessel;72 
(ii) the head charterers were entitled to delegate their power to sign to the sub-
charterers, which they did by the terms of the sub-charter;73  
(iii) the sub-charterers therefore had authority to sign bills of lading on behalf of the 
owners and (because the ship was trading worldwide) they could delegate the physical 
task of doing so to an agent;74 
(iv) both the agents in fact had authority to sign bills as agents of the sub-charterers;  
(v) accordingly, by virtue of this chain of delegated authority the sub-charterers' 
agents' signature bound the owners.”75 
The Rewia,76 further demonstrated this point. In that case the vessel was on time charter on 
the NYPE form having been amended. The charterparty provided for the master to sign bills 
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of lading as presented and a further clause provided “It is understood that the Master will 
authorise Charterers, or their Agents, to sign Bills of Lading on his behalf...”77 The vessel 
was duly sub-chartered, cargo was loaded on board the vessel, and liner bills of lading were 
issued on the sub-charterer’s standard form with no indication that the charterers were not the 
contracting carriers.78 The bills contained the sub-charterers name at the head of the bill, and 
the printed words “For the Master”.79 Beneath these words a stamp of the charterers agents 
together with an “indecipherable signature”80 appeared. The agent of the charterer or the sub-
charterer had performed the act of signature, but it was not discovered as to which of them it 
had been. The cargo interests instituted action against the owner and/or sub-charterers for 
damage to cargo. One of the issues before the Court was whether the agent had authority to 
sign on behalf of the master and thus bind the shipowners. The court found that the agent did 
in fact have such authority and held that: 
“In the present case the master was required to sign bills of lading as presented, and 
the understanding was that with his authority the charterers or their agents would sign 
them on his behalf ...81 The bills of lading ... were signed for the master by agents to 
whom he was empowered to give authority and must be taken to have done so, since 
he was required to sign them as presented. The master was in fact the servant of the 
shipowners.”82  
The court concluded that, “a bill of lading signed for the master cannot be a charterer’s bill, 
unless the contract was made with the charterers alone, and the person signing has authority 
to sign and does sign, on behalf of the charterers and not the owners.”83 
2.2.2 (d).  Signature by charterers and charterer’s agents on behalf of charterers 
As discussed above, time charterparties often authorise charterers and their agents to sign 
bills of lading in respect of goods shipped.84 However this fact does not always indicate that 
the contract of carriage shall be between the shipowner and the holders of the bills of 
lading.85 Reilly states that a bill of lading signed by the charterer in its own name will 
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constitute a contract between the charterer and the shipper where “no shipper would assume 
that the bill of lading was issued on behalf of the shipowner.”86 This would be the case when 
the bill is on the charterer’s form with the charterer’s name or logo in the heading, indicating 
that it was signed “for and on behalf of the charterers.” But even then, there has been legal 
dispute in English cases where a demise clause or identity of carrier clause appears on the 
bill. 
It may be agreed upon between the shipowner and the charterer in terms of the charterparty 
that a bill of lading signed by the master shall be binding on the charterer.87 In such a case, 
these bills signed “for and on behalf of the charterer” will be binding on the charterer if the 
master had authority to sign for the charterer.88 For the sake of being certain that such 
agreement shall be binding as against third parties, the shipowner must guard against the 
master acting in a manner giving rise to apparent or ostensible authority.89 The master is to 
guard against signing bills of lading in a manner so as to create a belief in third parties that he 
signs as an employee of the shipowner.90 The master must therefore remove all indications on 
the bill leading to him acting on behalf of the shipowner.91  
In Harrison v Huddersfield S.S. Co. Ltd,92 it was found that the shipowner and time charterer 
agreed that for the duration of the time charter, the master was not authorised to sign bills for 
the shipowner.93 While the vessel was on time charter, the evidence was that the master’s 
signature on this form was an express instruction of the charterers, and not authorised by the 
shipowners. As such, the master in signing bills of lading deleted the words “As Master” and 
replaced it with the written words “as agents for time charterers.”94 This mode of signature 
against the background of “the whole circumstances of the case” meant that the charterers 
were party to the contract. As a result, holders of the bills of lading could not recover 
damages from the shipowners for short delivery of their goods.95   
In addition, where charterers and/or agents sign bills of lading with no clear indication that 
they sign for the master and thus the shipowner, the relevant facts and circumstances must be 
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carefully construed to ascertain if the charterer contracted as carrier with holders of the bills 
of lading.96 
Therefore, the general presumption in the case of a charter, other than a demise charter, that 
“a bill of lading signed by the master or by the charterer as authorised agent of the master is 
usually a contract with the shipowner” is not one that is fixed.97 “It always falls to be decided 
on the facts and documents of each case.”98 As per Hamilton J (as he then was) in Steamship 
Calcutta Co. Ltd, v. Andrew Weir & Co.,99 it is “in each case… necessary for the Judge… to 
determine for himself on the documents and circumstances of the case whether the contract 
for the carriage of the cargo is made with the charterers or with the owners.”100 
Although the analysis above focused on a classic time charterparty, similar considerations 
would apply when considering a slot charterparty. A slot charter is a “hybrid” type of contract 
as the slot charterer hires a certain number of slots on each vessel but does not take over 
control of the operation of the vessel.101 In such a scenario, each slot charterer would issue 
bills of lading on their own form to their customers. Reilly argues that in this situation, the 
carrier is the slot charterer who issued the bill, but it may also be the shipowner.102 
 
2.2.3.  The heading of the bill of lading 
Under a time charter, a bill of lading may be issued on the shipowner’s form with the name of 
the shipowner appearing in the heading, or on the charterer’s form with the name of the 
charterer appearing in the heading or the bill may be blank. However, identifying the carrier 
using the heading of the bill cannot be regarded as conclusive.103 This is because the form 
used may contain a named person in its heading who is not contractually linked to the 
contract of carriage.104 As such, the heading of a bill of lading is significant in identifying the 
carrier where it is consistent with the signature on the bill.105 
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However, when dealing with a third party holder of a bill of lading acting in good faith, it is 
important to note that such a person is not the original contracting party to the contract of 
carriage, and commonly is unaware of the details concerning the carrier, except for those 
appearing on the bill of lading.106 Third parties may not know of the existence of a time 
charter and cannot be expected to investigate the relationship between the shipowner and the 
charterer pursuant to the time charterparty. Also, they cannot be expected to have knowledge 
of why the name of the charterer appears in the heading of the bill of lading.107 Pejovic 
concludes that where the charterer’s name appears in the heading of the bill of lading, the 
carrier is the charterer by implication and the third party is justified in concluding same. Rix J 
made a similar point in The Starsin108 and held that “[a] shipper would… look at the face of 
the bill to see [which] person was described as the carrier.”109 
However, this conclusion is overstated in a case where other indicators give rise to ambiguity 
or a contradiction, in such a case the heading of the bill is not definitive. The case law is 
discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
2.2.4.  The demise clause  
Historically, the demise clause had been inserted into bills of lading in the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America, since only shipowners in the case of the United Kingdom 
and in the case of the United States shipowners and demise charterers were permitted to 
statutorily limit their liability. Time charterers and voyage charterers were excluded from the 
statutory limitation of liability, exposing them to unlimited liability.110 
The demise clause is found on the reverse side of a bill and essentially provides that if the 
vessel is neither owned nor demise chartered to the company that issues the bill, the contract 
of carriage evidenced by the bill is between the shipowner/demise charterer and the shipper. 
It follows that the time charterer attracts “no personal liability whatsoever”111 in terms of the 
contract of carriage.112  
The following is a classic example of the demise clause: 
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“If the ship is not owned by or chartered to the company or line by whom this bill of 
lading is issued, this bill of lading shall take effect only as contract with the owner or 
demise charterer as the case may be as principal made through the agency of the said 
company or line who acts as agents only and shall be under no personal liability 
whatsoever in respect thereof.”113  
 
In English case law, the demise clause is said to operate within the law of agency. As such, it 
has been held that the demise clause indicates that the signatory signs the bill on behalf of the 
shipowner or demise charterer.114 But this is only one indication of the agency mandate. 
There can be contrary indicators on the bill indicating that the signatory does not sign for the 
shipowner or demise charterer. The English case authorities have found that the demise 
clause is not a “paramount clause” and therefore does not override other contrary 
indications.115 This will be discussed in Chapter three. 
Additionally, English case law has not discussed whether the demise clause is invalid as 
being contrary to Article 3(8) of the Hague-Visby Rules. On the contrary, in the United States 
of America and Canada, although their case law is not completely consistent, the demise 
clause has been held to be invalid for that reason. This will be discussed in Chapters four and 
five.  
 
2.2.5.  The identity of carrier clause  
A clause that is closely related to the demise clause is the identity of carrier clause. This 
clause states that: 
“The contract evidenced by this Bill of Lading is between the Merchant and the 
Owner of the vessel named herein and it is therefore agreed that said Shipowner only 
shall be liable for any damage or loss due to any breach or non-performance of any 
obligation arising out of the contract of carriage, whether or not relating to the 
vessel’s seaworthiness.”116  
The identity of carrier clause is similar to the demise clause in its purpose and nature; and is 
often inserted into bills of ladings enabling charterers to circumvent unlimited liability. The 
identity of carrier clause provides that the shipowner is the carrier under the contract of 
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carriage while the time charterer or voyage charterer issuing the bill acts merely as the agent 
on the shipowner’s behalf.117 
There is sometimes a second type of identity of carrier clause known as the “definitions 
clause.” For example, in The Venezuela,118 the court found the charterer C.A.V.N to be the 
carrier in the definitions clause.  
 
2.3.  Extrinsic evidence to the bill of lading (For whom was the bill of lading issued?) 
Apart from indicators on the bill of lading itself, courts also take into consideration evidence 
concerning the surrounding circumstances in which the bill of lading was issued to ascertain 
on whose behalf the bill had been issued. 
 
2.4.  Can there be more than one carrier? An interpretation of the Hague/Visby   
Rules and the Hamburg Rules 
Article 1(a) of the schedule to South Africa’s Carriage of Goods by Sea Act119 incorporating 
the Hague-Visby Rules120 provides that: “‘Carrier’ includes the owner or the charterer who 
enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper.”121 However, it does not expressly state 
whether the carrier may be only the shipowner or only the charterer, or if the term may 
include another party.122 The term carrier has been generally defined in the Hague and 
Hague-Visby Rules123 not clearly indicating if there may be more than one.124 Further, the 
definition is not extensive enough to include another party that a carrier may appoint to 
“handle” the cargo.125 For instance, a sub-contracted stevedore appointed to unload a vessel 
will not be imposed with any obligations126 under the Rules.127 
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The general position taken by English courts is that there is but one contracting carrier, that 
being the shipowner or the charterer of the vessel.128 The contracting carrier is the one having 
contracted with the shipper which contract is evidenced by the bill of lading.129  
Additionally, certain provisions in the Hague-Visby Rules presuppose the carrier to be the 
shipowner.130 For example, Article 3(1)(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules obliges the carrier to 
exercise “due diligence to make the ship seaworthy.”131 The duty of ensuring the ship’s 
seaworthiness is the shipowner’s duty. The responsibility of maintenance to the vessel lies 
with the shipowner and not the time charterer on whom commercial responsibility of the 
vessel rests.132 There are other provisions in the Hague-Visby Rules which are less clear, 
where the time charterer is responsible for “loading, handling, stowing, carrying and 
discharging the goods.”133 
Where the contracting carrier is the charterer, the holder of the bill of lading may find 
difficulties in bringing action against the time charterer contractually or in delict since the 
charterer does not undertake physical responsibility for carrying the cargo.134 Also, instituting 
action against charterers possessing no assets or who are otherwise not amenable to certain 
jurisdictions pose many difficulties for cargo interests.135 But where the contracting carrier is 
the shipowner, cargo interests may find solace in acquiring security for a cargo claim by 
arresting the vessel.  
The Hamburg Rules also define a “carrier” providing a broader definition than that of the 
Hague-Visby Rules. The Hamburg Rules define the carrier in Article 1 as “any person by 
whom or in whose name a contract of carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with a 
shipper.”136 The definition of carrier includes one who acts as principal in a contract of 
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carriage without intending to carry the goods himself.137 It includes freight forwarders, 
combined transport operating companies or a carrier not otherwise owning vessels.138 
The Hamburg Rules also draw a distinction between the “carrier” and the “actual carrier”, the 
actual carrier being the one responsible for performing the carriage of goods.139 Where the 
carrier does not himself perform the carriage, any person involved in performing the carriage 
will be termed as the “actual carrier.”140 As such, the Rules clearly indicate that the party to 
the contract of carriage (the contracting carrier) may be different from the one responsible for 
transporting the cargo.141 
Article 10.1 of the Hamburg Rules further stipulate that in the case of the contracting carrier 
entrusting performance of the carriage to an actual carrier, the contracting carrier “remains 
responsible” throughout for all “acts and omissions of [such actual carrier] and of his servants 
and agents acting within the scope of their employment.”142 The contracting carrier retains 
responsibility irrespective of any liberty clause contained in the contract of carriage.143 In 
addition, the Rules govern the responsibility of the actual carrier in respect of the carriage he 
actually performed; and provide for joint and several liability of both carriers where their 
obligations overlap.144 As such, a cargo interest may claim from either the contracting carrier 
or the actual carrier in terms of Article 10(4).145 It is important to note that the actual carrier 
incurs no obligation under these Rules unless he has performed the carriage.146 
 In this way, the Hamburg Rules differ from the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules as the 
Hague/Visby Rules make provision for only one carrier - that being the contracting carrier.147 
The Hamburg Rules impose the same obligations on both the “actual carrier” and the 
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“contracting carrier148  thus allowing for cargo interests to bring action against the “actual 
carrier” for loss or damage incurred during the performance of his part of the carriage even if 
he was not the contracting carrier at the relevant time. However, unlike the Hague-Visby 
Rules, the Hamburg Rules make no express provision for the duty of “due diligence” on the 
part of the shipowner to make the ship seaworthy, therefore where a demise charterer issues a 
bill of lading and a time charterer performs the actual carriage,149  the question is whether the 
shipowner would have any responsibilities applicable to him under the Rules enabling him to 
be identified as an actual carrier.150 
 
2.5.  Is the demise clause an exemption clause in conflict with Article 3(8) of the 
Hague-Visby Rules? 
The demise clause has been infamously known as a clause that aimed to detract from the 
provisions of the Hague Rules and Hague-Visby Rules.151 The Hague Rules and Hague-
Visby Rules are of “public order” (a law which cannot be contracted out of)152 and apply 
mandatorily to any party acting as a carrier. The provisions of the Hague/Visby Rules were 
designed to create a just and equitable balance in the rights and obligations between the 
carrier and the shipper.153  
According to Tetley, the demise clause and identity of carrier clause aim to contravene the 
principles contained in the Hague Rules and Hague-Visby Rules.154 The demise clause is said 
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to circumvent the liability of the contracting carrier by allowing the carrier to deny that it is 
the contracting carrier,155 and to assert rather that it acts only as agent for the shipowner.156 
Tetley regards these clauses as “non-responsibility clauses”157 in direct conflict with Article 
3(8) of the Hague-Visby Rules.158 The “principle of fair balance” as between the rights and 
obligations of the carrier and shipper was strongly affirmed in Encyclopedia Britannica v. 
S.S. Hong Kong Producer,159 where the court held that: 
“The purposes behind…the Hague Rules and COGSA were to achieve a fair 
balancing of the interests of the carrier, on the one hand, and the shipper, on the other, 
and also to effectuate a standard and uniform set of persistent efforts by carriers, who 
are the drafters of ocean bills of lading, to limit or eliminate their own duties and 
responsibilities under the Act by inserting into the foot long, double columns of well-
nigh indecipherable fine print, various exceptions to their possible liabilities, COGSA 
included self-protective provision, § 1303(8), which prohibited the inclusion of 
clauses which relieve the carrier or ship from liability for loss or damage to goods 
arising from negligence, fault or failure in fulfilling obligations specified in other 
portions of the section or lessening such liabilities.”160 
The Hague and Hague-Visby Rules render void any clause contained in a contract of carriage 
seeking to “relieve or lessen the liability” of a carrier for loss or damage to goods as a result 
of negligence or fault on the part of the carrier in fulfilling its duties and obligations.161 
Article 3(8) specifically detracts the carrier from contracting out of his obligations under 
article 2, 3 and 4 of the Rules.162 The Hamburg Rules also prohibit any inclusion in a bill of 
lading which “derogates directly or indirectly” from the principles of the Rules.163 In light of 
these provisions, Tetley asserts strongly that the demise clause ought to be rendered null and 
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void as it amounts to “illegal attempts by charterers to limit or exclude their liability contrary 
to the Rules.”164 
 
2.6.  Conclusion  
Following the above discussion, it is evident that the various indicators on a bill of lading 
present great difficulty in identifying the contractual carrier under a bill of lading. Amongst 
other indicators on a bill, this chapter discussed the significance of the signature under a bill, 
as well as the importance of the qualification accompanying the signature. It has been 
established that bills of lading signed by the master or the charterer by authority of the master 
will bind the shipowner unless it has been agreed between the shipowner and charterer in 
terms of the charterparty that the bill of lading signed by the master shall bind the charterer 
alone. In this case, the master must be authorized by the charterer to sign, and the bill must be 
signed “for and on behalf of the charterer.” 
In keeping with the question of identifying the contractual carrier under a bill of lading, the 
discussion focused on the definition of “carrier” under the Hague-Visby Rules and the 
Hamburg Rules. The chapter demonstrated a comparison between the definition of “carrier” 
under the Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules; and found that whilst the Hague-Visby 
Rules lean toward the possibility of only one contracting carrier; the Hamburg Rules provide 
a more extensive definition accommodating for more than one carrier to a contract of 
carriage.  
This chapter also discussed the demise clause and identity of carrier clause often inserted into 
bills of lading notorious for resulting in conflicts with other indicators seeking to identify the 
contractual carrier under a bill. These clauses have often been deemed to be “non-
responsibility clauses”165 enabling charterers to circumvent their liability as carriers under 
bills of lading.  
Chapter three will discuss the treatment of the demise clause and identity of carrier clause in 
identifying the contractual carrier within English Courts drawing comparisons between the 
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original position in cases such as The Berkshire166 and the current position adopted in The 
Starsin.167
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Chapter Three: The identity of the carrier problem under English Law 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
This chapter seeks to examine the effectiveness of the demise clause and identity of carrier 
clause in identifying the contracting carrier under bills of lading in English law. The chapter 
will analyse the different approaches taken by English Courts in various cases to the 
interpretation of bills of lading paying particular attention to the treatment of the demise 
clause and identity of carrier clause. The chapter will assess the current approach adopted by 
English Courts to identifying the carrier and how the current approach differs from the 
approach historically taken by the courts. 
 
3.2.  Statutory law and International Conventions governing the carriage of goods by 
sea in the United Kingdom 
During the nineteenth century amidst uncertainty concerning the contractual allocation of risk 
for loss and damage to cargo, the shipowner, being the carrier at common law was 
“absolutely liable” for cargo loss unless it could be shown that the shipowner’s negligence 
did not play a contributory role to the cargo loss and, that one of four excepted perils was 
found to exist.1 These four exceptions included:2  
1. An act of God; 
2. Act of public enemies (the King or Queen’s enemies); 
3. Fault on the part of the shipper; or 
4. Inherent vice of the goods.3 
As such, when one of the four exceptions existed, the carrier could be held liable only if fault 
could be proved. In every other instance, the carrier could be found liable, even if he had not 
been at fault.4 However, the common law principle of freedom of contract took precedence 
over this rule allowing for a carefully worded bill of lading or charterparty to relieve the 
carrier of his liability for cargo loss and damage.5  
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Therefore, the nineteenth century saw many nations promulgating different legislations 
governing the carriage of goods by sea and attributing rights and responsibilities to carriers 
and cargo interests.6 The Harter Act was enacted in the United States of America in 1893, 
later in 1903 New Zealand passed The Shipping and Seaman Act, whilst Australia enacted 
The Sea Carriage of Goods Act in 1904. Canada followed suit in 1910 by promulgating The 
Water Carriage of Goods Act in 1910.7 
In May 1921, the International Law Association’s Maritime Law Committee (formerly 
known as the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations) chaired by 
Sir Henry Duke, president of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the English 
High Court of Justice8 came together to produce a “model law” regulating the carriage of 
goods by sea internationally.9 A first draft was put forward at The Hague during the 
Associations Conference in September 1921.10 This first draft became “The Hague Rules of 
1921.”11 These Rules were considered and contested at great length by the Comité Maritime 
International (CMI) in London and the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law in Brussels. 
The conference culminated in “The Hague Rules of 1922.”12 In 1924, another draft of the 
convention was produced known as the Hague Rules of 1924. 
Before the diplomatic conference had been completed, a bill was tabled in March 1923 in the 
United Kingdom incorporating the Hague Rules of 1922.13 The House of Lords and the 
House of Commons formulated a committee chaired by Lord Sterndale, the Master of the 
Rolls, to assess the Rules.14  The Rules were strongly contested by Lord Justice Scrutton, a 
judge of the Court of Appeal and Mr Frank MacKinnon Q.C, as he then was, stating that the 
rules lacked clarity and would lead to increased lawsuits.15 However, it was decided that 
these contentions did not “outweigh the advantages to be gained by giving statutory force to 
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an agreement concluded by those chiefly affected by legislation.”16 The Rules were 
ultimately enacted with amendments.17  
The British Parliament introduced a new Carriage of Goods by Sea Bill into the House of 
Lords in 1924. The Bill’s schedule incorporated the most recent of the Hague Rules as 
amended by the sous-commission. The Bill was assented to and The Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act was enacted on 1 August 1924 in the United Kingdom.18  The Hague Rules were 
enacted by the Brussels conference a few weeks later and was opened for signature.19 The 
Hague Rules sets out the liabilities of the carrier, prescribes limitations to the carrier’s 
liability and deals with the carrier’s exemptions.20 
With the increase of containerization in modern shipping trade, and the need for increased 
limitation of liability21 a diplomatic conference directed by the CMI began in Brussels in 
1968 and a Protocol amending the Hague Rules was promulgated.22 The diplomatic 
conference concluded an Amendment to The Hague Rules known as the Hague-Visby 
Amendments. The Hague-Visby Rules were later amended again in 1979 taking into 
consideration the imbalances in currency exchange (The SDR Protocol of 1979).23 
Currently, the British Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 197124 enacts the Hague-Visby Rules as 
a schedule thus repealing the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1924 that had the Hague Rules 
as a schedule. The Rules have legal application by domestic legislation to bills of lading 
issued in the United Kingdom.25  
As discussed in the previous chapter; neither the Hague Rules nor the Hague-Visby Rules 
adequately define the carrier; and the question of who is the carrier took on great significance 
after the enactment of the limitation of liability provisions of The Merchant Shipping Act 
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protecting shipowners and demise charterers.26 It was in this background that the demise 
clause and identity of carrier clause began to appear in bills of lading in the United Kingdom.  
 
3.3.  The traditional approach taken by English Courts on the effectiveness of the 
demise clause and identity of carrier clause (An analysis of case law) 
English Courts have been inclined to consider the demise clause and identity of carrier clause 
as reliable indicators in identifying the carrier and have often given effect to their 
provisions.27 One such case is The Berkshire28 which has been the leading case on the 
question of the identity of the carrier before the decision in The Starsin.29 
In The Berkshire,30 the shipper of the goods entered into a contract of sale for bales of cotton 
with the receivers of the goods c.i.f Massawa. The shipper subsequently loaded the goods on 
board the vessel “Lancashire” owned by Bibby Line Ltd for carriage and delivery to 
Massawa.31 The vessel operated under time charter between the shipowner and the charterers 
known as Compass Agencies Inc. of Chicago. The charterer’s agent known as Ocean Wide 
Shipping Co. Ltd, issued a bill of lading on their own printed form, but the bill contained a 
demise clause. Further, the bill was signed by the charterer’s sub-agents, known as Ayers 
Steamship Co. Inc.32 
The charterers then ordered the master to discharge the goods at Jeddah for transhipment to 
Massawa. Upon arrival at Jeddah, the goods were discharged and transhipped onto the vessel 
Star of Mariam for delivery to Massawa.33 The Star of Mariam was owned by Orri 
Navigation Lines of Saudi Arabia. At the time of transhipment, the goods remained in good 
order and condition.34 However, upon arrival at Massawa, the goods discharged were 
damaged by sea water. The shippers and receivers of the cargo claimed damages for breach 
of contract against the shipowners of the vessel Lancashire.35 
The court considered the issue of whether the contractual carrier was the shipowner or the 
charterer? In considering this question, the court considered two sub-issues; whether the bill 
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of lading evidenced a contract of carriage between the shippers and shipowners; and; if so, 
whether the charterer and his sub-charterer had authority to issue the bill of lading?36 
In considering the first sub-issue, the court found it necessary to examine the construction of 
the bill of lading. The court found both sides of the bill to bear the name of the charterer’s 
agent, the shipping line Ocean Wide Shipping Co. Ltd. The back of the bill contained details 
for shipment including the names of the shipper and consignee. Below this, a demise clause 
was found and below the demise clause a final sentence appeared stating; “In witness 
whereof, the master or agent of the said vessel has signed three bills of lading, all of this tenor 
and date, and if one is accomplished, the other shall be void.” After this sentence, the 
following typed words in capitals appeared in the space provided for signature by the master 
or agent of the vessel: 
“Ocean Wide Shipping Co.Ltd., 
Ayers Steamship Co. Inc. as Agents 
[Illegible signature] 
Fred Perez Jr.”37 
It was clear that charterers sub-agents signed the bill however the words “for the master” did 
not appear on the bill. As such, it was unclear for whom the bill was signed. 
On this first point, Brandon J held there to be “no reason not to give effect to the demise 
clause in accordance with its terms.”38 Within the meaning of the demise clause, Ocean Wide 
was the company or line that issued the bill of lading and it was common cause that the vessel 
was owned by the shipowners.39 The court held that the bill of lading purported to be a 
contract between the shippers and the shipowners which contract was made by Ocean Wide 
as the shipowner’s agents. Additionally, the fact that Ayers signed the bill as sub-agents 
proved immaterial and was held to be the same as if Ocean Wide had signed the bill itself.40 
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In considering the second sub-issue, Brandon J assessed the terms of the charterparty and 
held that Clause 8 of the NYPE entitled the charterer to issue a bill of lading containing a 
demise clause to bind the shipowner.41 
The shipowners contended that the demise clause purported to be an “extraordinary clause” 
and that charterers may not lawfully present a bill containing such a clause to the master for 
signature to bind shipowners. Brandon J disagreed with this contention and held the demise 
clause to be “entirely usual and ordinary.”42 The demise clause was not found to be an 
extraordinary term or a clause manifestly inconsistent with the charterparty. Instead, the 
demise clause reiterated that the charterparty entitled shipowner’s bills to be issued and 
signed by the master, the charterer or its agents and sub-agents on the shipowner’s behalf.43 
The court held that signing a bill of lading was a ministerial act. In this case, the demise 
clause was afforded precedence over other provisions in the bill of lading. The signature on 
the bill was not taken to be a decisive factor when identifying the carrier. 
The judgement in The Venezuela44 demonstrated a similar line of reasoning to that of The 
Berkshire,45 however it differed in that the bill did not contain a demise clause. But, the bill 
did contain a definitions clause which is a form of identity of carrier clause. In this case, the 
definitions clause named the time charterers as the carrier, yet nothing else in the bill 
indicated the charterers to be the carrier.46 Charterer’s agents NYK signed the bills under the 
words “signed by or on behalf of the master”47 and beneath these words appeared in print the 
charterer’s name. Beneath those words appeared, “NYK general agents and as agents for the 
master.”48 The court reasoned that the mode of signature on the bill did not cause the bill to 
be an owner’s bill. The definitions clause and the fact that the face of the bill contained no 
indication that the vessel was on time charter and led the court to find that the time charterer 
was the contracting carrier.49 The significance that the court placed on this factor may be 
attributable to the fact that cargo interests cannot arrest the vessel in rem where the vessel 
was on time charter. So, if the definitions clause had made it clear that C.A.V.N was a time 
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charterer, then there would be contradiction between that clause and the signature on the bill 
of lading for the master. But since the bill did not make it clear, the court held: 
“It seems to me that if C.A.V.N. did not wish to contract as ‘the carrier’, then the bill 
of lading issued by C.A.V.N. should at least have made it clear with which company 
the shipper was entering into the contract of carriage. Until the shipper or holder of 
the bill of lading was told that Samjohn Governor was on time charter for the voyage 
in question there was nothing on either side of the bill of lading which indicated that 
anyone other than C.A.V.N. was contracting as carrier” 
 
In this case, the court placed emphasis on a specific indicator namely the definitions clause to 
determine the contracting carrier rather than the signature and the attestation clause 
accompanying the signature.50 The case demonstrated that even a signature signed for the 
master will not preclude the charterers from being held as carrier under a bill of lading. This 
is because C.A.V.N. was identified as the carrier upon construing the bill of lading in its 
entirety considering all indicators and surrounding factors.51 The case demonstrates that 
courts will attempt to safeguard cargo interests who might be unaware of the significance of 
the “signature provisions” contained in the charterparty agreement and who may otherwise be 
misguided by information on the bill.52  
This case did not find approval in The Rewia.53 In that case, the vessel Rewia operated under 
time charter on the NYPE form. The owners of a cargo of nutmegs and mace as cargo 
interests claimed damages in respect of cargo carried on the vessel to Felixstowe, Rotterdam 
and Hamburg under contracts of carriage evidenced by bills of lading.54 The claim was 
pursued against the shipowners and/or the sub-charterers of the vessel.55 Amongst three other 
issues of contention, the Court of Appeal considered the issue of “whether the shipowners 
were parties to the bills of lading.”56 
The cargo interests alleged that the contract of carriage was concluded orally with the time 
charterers local agents at the port of shipment in Grenada, and that they were unaware that 
the vessel operated under time charter.57 Liner bills of lading were issued on the sub-
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charterer’s standard form bearing the names of the sub-charterers at its heading.58  The bills 
contained the printed words “For the Master” and beneath these words a stamp of the 
charterers agents together with an “indecipherable signature” appeared.59 There was no 
carrier definition clause nor was there a demise clause or an identity of carrier clause 
contained in the bill of lading. The shipowners sought to be found as the contracting carrier 
for the purposes of jurisdiction.60 The shipowners argued that the bills signed “For the 
Master” by charterers agents or sub-charterers were binding on the shipowners as a party to 
the contract of carriage. Clause 53 of the charterparty agreement provided that: 
“It is understood that the Master will authorise Charterers, or their Agents, to sign 
Bills of Lading on his behalf provided the Bills are made up in accordance with 
Mate’s and Tally Clerk’s Receipts.”  
 
This clause, according to the shipowners, entitled agents to sign for the master on behalf of 
the shipowners. Further, the shipowners contended that even if “prior authority”61 had not 
been given, since the master knew of the bills of lading and accordingly carried the goods, it 
was possible for the master to subsequently ratify the agent’s signature.62 
The cargo interests contended that the bills of lading constituted charterer’s bills as “the bills 
contained no clause identifying any person other than the [sub charterers] as ‘carriers.”63 
The Court of Appeal in deciding the question of who is the carrier and thus whether the sub-
charterers were parties to the contract of carriage evidenced by the bills; held the question to 
be a matter of “the true construction of the bills in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances.”64 The Court held that the “key words”65 contained in the bill are the words 
“For the master.”66 This indicated that the bill signed for the master was binding on the 
shipowners. It was concluded that a bill signed for the master could not constitute a 
charterer’s bill except if the contract of carriage was made with the charterer only, and the 
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person signing the bill signs (with authority) on behalf of the charterers only.67 The cargo 
interests were found to have no claim against the sub-charterers.68 
Contrary to The Venezuela,69 the Court in The Rewia70 reasoned that greater weight must be 
given to the signature and its qualification rather than to other indicators such as a definitions 
clause, demise clause and/or identity of carrier clause when determining the contracting 
carrier.71 
However, the above well-established principle has not always been followed as the general 
rule. This is demonstrated in the case of The Flecha;72 where signatures on the bills were held 
not to be the determining factor in identifying the carrier. In this case, the defendants who 
owned the vessel ‘Flecha’, entered into a time charter with Continental Pacific Shipping Ltd 
for a time charter trip from Indonesia and Malaysia to the UK. The vessel loaded parcels of 
wood products on board at numerous Far Eastern ports and bills of lading had been issued in 
respect of the carriage to Rotterdam. Certain parcels of cargo had been damaged during the 
voyage, and the shipowner’s P & I club produced a letter to prevent the arrest of the Flecha. 
A writ was subsequently issued against the ship “claiming damages for breach of contract and 
negligence in loading, handling, custody, care and discharge of the cargo in respect of which 
the plaintiffs were holders of the bills of lading.”73 
The bills of lading were issued on the form of Continental Pacific Shipping (the time 
charterers) but contained an identity of carrier clause as well as a demise clause. The bills 
were signed by charterer’s agents as follows, “Multiport Sdn Bhd…[signature] as agents for 
Continental Shipping as carriers.” The issue before the court was whether the bills of lading 
constituted owner’s bills evidencing a contract of carriage between the shipowners and the 
holders of the bills; or whether they were charterers bills evidencing a contract of carriage 
between the charterers and the holders of the bills.74 
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The court drew similarities between the case before it and The Berkshire75 and prompted the 
question “Who is undertaking the contract of carriage?”76 Commonly, liner bills of lading are 
issued on a “standard form” with the liner company’s name on it, and such company may not 
always be the time charterer of the vessel. The court held that the bills of lading, despite 
having been issued on time charterers’ form, contained standard terms, and upon viewing 
those terms and the face of the bill, the bill clearly evidences a contract of carriage between 
the shipowner and the holders of the bills.77 
Justice Moore-Bick reasoned that the forms of signature on the bills of lading may suggest 
the time charterers Continental Shipping to be the carriers.78 However, upon viewing the 
contract in a wider context, he held that the contract set out in the printed form was intended 
to be a contract between the shipowner and the cargo interests.79 In determining the intention 
of the parties as to whether the charterers or the shipowners were responsible for the carriage, 
the court held that the document is to be considered as a whole in its wider context.80 The 
court also considered the terms “as a carrier” and held that liner companies are usually 
loosely referred to ‘as a carrier’ to describe the shipping line.81 
Additionally, under a time charterparty, the charterers are entitled to sign bills of lading on 
the shipowner’s behalf. This effectively means that the shipowner would be bound by the 
charterer’s signature. This is contained in the demise clause and identity of carrier clause 
found in the bill of lading.82  
The court found that for the charterers to be held as the contracting carrier, it ought to have 
been stated more clearly that the time charterers intended to be personally liable for the 
carriage of goods.83 The signatures featured on the bills of lading proved insufficient to show 
that the charterers were parties to the contract of carriage.84 The court held that upon a true 
                                                            
75
 The Berkshire supra note 28 above. 
76
 The Flecha supra note 72 at 618. 
77
 The Flecha supra note 72 at 618. 
78
 The Flecha supra note 72 at 618. 
79
 The Flecha supra note 72 at 618. 
80
 The Flecha supra note 72 at 618. 
81
 The Flecha supra note 72 at 619. 
82
 The Flecha supra note 72 at 618. 
83
 The Flecha supra note 72 at 618. 
84
 The Flecha supra note 72 at 618 – 619. 
39 
 
construction of the bills of lading, they evidenced contracts of carriage between the cargo 
interests and the shipowners.85 
This case clearly demonstrates that English Courts have been willing to give effect to the 
demise clause and identity of carrier clause even though bills of lading had been issued on 
time charterers’ forms and with charterers and/or their agent’s signatures.86 The courts have 
overall found that viewing the bill of lading in its whole context is key to identifying the 
carrier. However, upon an analysis of each case, it can be seen that the courts have been 
inclined to give greater weight to a specific indicator on the bill, be it the signature and for 
whom the bill had been signed, or the printed demise clause and/or identity of carrier clause, 
or even the printed definitions clause on the bill of lading. 
 
3.4.  A revolutionary change in English case law  
The Starsin87 provided a revolutionary change in the approach adopted by the courts when 
determining the identity of the contracting carrier. As discussed previously, the courts in the 
leading cases, The Berkshire88 and The Flecha89 attributed greater weight to the demise 
clause and identity of carrier clause rather than to other indicators on the bill of lading.90 
However, in The Starsin,91 where the bills were in all material respects identical to the bills in 
The Flecha,92 Colman J in the court of first instance attributed significance to indicators on 
the bill of lading quite differently to the court in The Flecha.93  
 
3.4.1.  The Commercial Court 
The Court of first instance in The Starsin94 considered the problems faced by the cargo 
interests in understanding the words found in the bills and the sense in which they could be 
expected to have understood these words.95 Colman J found it increasingly necessary for 
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holders of bills to have certainty concerning the party with whom it had contracted and 
against whom it may have a contractual claim.96 
In The Starsin,97 the vessel carrying parcels of timber and plywood between ports in Malaysia 
and Antwerp/Avonmouth was on time charter to Continental Pacific Shipping Ltd (CPS). The 
condition of the cargo deteriorated on board the vessel as it had been stowed negligently 
before the voyage began.98 The bills of lading issued were transferable bills in terms of which 
the cargo owners were holders of the bills by endorsement.99 Upon discharge of the cargo, the 
cargo owners instituted action against the shipowner for breach of contract, or alternatively in 
delict for negligent stowage, if the charterers were found to be the contracting party. 
The time charter was expressly governed by English law and the NYPE form was used. 
Clause 8 and 33 of the time charterparty agreement provided that the charterer is entitled to 
require the master to sign bills of lading on behalf of the shipowners or to authorize their 
agents to sign bills of lading on behalf of the master contracting for the shipowner.100 
Numerous bills of lading were issued on the time charterer’s “pre-prepared printed forms”101 
with its logo and the printed words “Continental Pacific Shipping” on the face of the bill. The 
face of the bill also contained details of the voyage including details identifying the shipper, 
the consignee, the notify address, the vessel and the voyage number, the port of loading and 
the port of discharge.102 In the bottom left corner on the face of the bill was the signature box, 
and the word “Signature” appeared in printed form.103 Additionally, the attestation clause for 
signature by the master appeared on the face of the bill. However, the bills were not signed 
by or on behalf of the master of the vessel.104 Instead, the signature box was filled by port 
agents in typed words “As Agent for Continental Pacific Shipping (The Carrier),”105 beneath 
which was a rubber stamp bearing the name of the company acting as port agent for CPS. 
Across the box appeared two “manuscript signatures.”106 The signature boxes in each bill of 
lading identified CPS as the “carrier.” 
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The back of the bills contained printed clauses in small font including a definitions clause, in 
which clause 1(c) defined the “carrier” as “the party on whose behalf this Bill of Lading has 
been signed.”107 The back of the bills also contained a printed demise clause (clause 35) and 
a printed identity of carrier clause (clause 33) stating that the contracting party was the owner 
of the vessel/demise charterer alone and that any other party entering into the contract, acted 
as agent for the owner. It was here where incompatibility between the indicators crept in. 
Of the three issues discussed by the Court of Appeal, the issue before the court relevant for 
the present discussion was whether the contractual carrier was the shipowner or the 
charterer.108  
In the Court of first instance Colman J found the issue of whether the bills constituted 
owner’s bills or charterers’ bills to be a question of “whether the effect of the words in the 
signature box [was] to identify CPS as the party bound by the bill of lading contract 
notwithstanding clause 33(identity of carrier clause) and 35(demise clause).”109 In relation to 
this, he held that the qualification of the signature on the bill, (that being the typed words 
added identifying CPS as the carrier), must be given greater weight than those printed clauses 
appearing on the bill.110 This is in accordance with the maxim that “written, stamped or typed 
words which are inconsistent with printed terms111 are prima facie to be given a superseding 
effect as against the printed words.”112 As such, Colman J found the typed words qualifying 
CPS as the carrier in the signature box to supersede the effect of the pre-printed demise 
clause and identity of carrier clause on the back of the bills. 
Colman J held further that the term ‘carrier’ was not used “loosely” to define the time 
charterers, contrary to the views of Moore-Bick J in The Flecha.113 He held that the words “as 
carrier” in the signature box were not “too vague and uncertain”114 to displace the printed 
identity of carrier clause and demise clause, and/or the attestation clause.115 Colman J found 
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the bills to be charterers’ bills and the charterers were accordingly held to be the contracting 
carrier. 
 
3.4.2.  The Court of Appeal 
On appeal, the Court relied extensively on construing the bill of lading in its whole factual 
context and undertook an examination of the various indicators to determine the contractual 
carrier.  
In the Court of Appeal, the claimants contended that the demise clause particularly the words 
in parenthesis “as may be the case notwithstanding anything that appeared to the contrary,” 
upon a true construction, intends to be a paramount clause, notwithstanding that the signature 
box indicates the bill to have been issued on behalf of a party other than the owner.116 On this 
point, Chadwick LJ writing for the majority held; he thinks it unnecessary to “invoke some 
principle of “paramountcy.””117 
Rix J in a dissenting judgement did consider the contention that a demise clause operates to 
override what is written in the signature box, but held that this could not be so.118 He held that 
the words in parenthesis did not apply to the execution of the bill of lading or to the signature 
on the bill, but rather to a situation where the liner company issuing the bill is not the vessel 
owner or demise charterer.119 The terms of the clause clarify that a time charterer/liner 
company does not attract liability as carrier by merely issuing a bill of lading. It does not 
intend to preclude a time charterer from attracting liability as carrier where he undertakes 
responsibility as the carrier and where he signed as such.120 If the demise clause were to be 
construed as a paramount clause, Rix J held that the demise clause would have to read and 
mean “however the bill of lading was executed, it [is] to take effect only as a contract solely 
with the owner.”121 This is not the intention of the demise clause.122 Rix J held that the 
demise clause is thus not a paramount clause. 
                                                            
116
 The Starsin supra [2001] note 102 at 447 para 45. 
117
 The Starsin supra [2001] note 102 at 470 para 164. 
118
 The Starsin supra [2001] note 102 at 450 para 61. 
119
 The Starsin supra [2001] note 102 at 450 para 61. 
120
 S Boyd Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading 20 ed (1996) 82. 
121
 The Starsin supra [2001] note 102 at 451 para 66. 
122
 The Starsin supra [2001] note 102 at 451 para 66. 
43 
 
A further point raised in argument was that the attestation clause provides that the bills were 
signed for the master and thus for the shipowner.123 Rix J held that the bills were not signed 
by the master, nor were they signed for the master. The attestation clause was held to be an 
“inaccurate statement.”124 Upon a whole construction of the bills, Rix J found the bills to be 
charterers’ bills thereby making the charterers the contractual carrier under the bills.125 
The majority of the Court however found the bills to be owners’ bills.126 Chadwick LJ 
disagreed with the findings of Rix J, but maintained the principle that the bill of lading must 
be read and construed in its whole context.127 The Judge of Appeal examined the position a 
shipper might find himself in when looking at the bill of lading. If the description of CPS in 
the signature box as carrier is to be effective, the definition of carrier found in the definitions’ 
clause (clause 1(c)) provides no conflict. The conflict creeps in with the opening words of the 
identity of carrier clause (Clause 33) which provides that “the contract evidenced by this Bill 
of Lading is between the Merchant and the Owner of the vessel named herein…”128 He held 
that a shipper is likely to reconcile these indicators and conclude that the person named as 
carrier in the signature box and as defined in the definitions clause is the owner of the vessel, 
that is that CPS is the shipowner.129 This line of reasoning can be likened to the approach 
taken in The Venezuela,130 where similarly the bill of lading did not expressly state that 
C.A.V.N was a time charterer. It is upon examining the facts that it is known - CPS is not the 
owner but the time charterer of the vessel having authority to sign bills of lading for and on 
behalf of the master.131 However the bills had not been signed in that capacity.132 
Chadwick LJ found the demise clause and particularly the words in parenthesis to apply 
where on the face of the bill it looks as if the bill was issued by the shipowner but upon 
finding out the true facts, the bill was not issued by the shipowner.133 As Lord Roskill and the 
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House of Lords quoting him put it, the words in parenthesis is intended “to put the bill of 
lading holder on express notice of the possibility that the ship concerned was chartered.”134 
In his judgement, Chadwick LJ discussed significant principles concerning the demise clause 
and identity of carrier clause which I respectfully submit should be used to assess the 
application of these clauses when construing the bill of lading in its entirety. In distinguishing 
between the identity of carrier clause and the demise clause, he pointed out that the identity 
of carrier clause applies only to cases where the bill of lading was made and issued by a liner 
company or its agent “for and on behalf of the master.”135 Thereby making it a bill that was 
“actually issued” by the master for the shipowner. In contrast, the demise clause applies to 
cases where the bill of lading is issued by a liner company who is not the shipowner, which 
bill is not signed “for and on behalf of the master.”136 The bill may very well be signed “as 
agent” or on behalf of the time charterer.137 Chadwick LJ in this way makes the qualification 
for issuing the bill “for and on behalf of the master” notably important in determining the 
functions of both clauses. The importance of this qualification was also found to be central in 
the judgement of The Rewia.138 
The Judge proceeded to describe the purpose of the demise clause as having “two limbs;”139 
Firstly; to ensure that the bill is effective as a contract of carriage with the shipowner who is 
not the party issuing the bill. This leg directly leads one to the question of authority.140 For 
this leg to be fulfilled, the party issuing the bill must have actual or ostensible authority 
derived from the shipowner to issue the bill.141 This may be found in the charterparty 
agreement as was discussed in the earlier chapter.  
Secondly; to ensure that the person having issued the bill will not attract personal liability 
under it.142 This leg however does not require the bill to be made or issued with the authority 
of the shipowner.143 This leg encapsulates that the charterer issuing the bill will not be held 
liable as carrier.  
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Chadwick LJ dealt with the inconsistency between the indicators by examining the bill, so as 
to determine whether the description of CPS as the “Carrier” in the signature box must 
“yield”144 to the words of the identity of carrier clause.145 The Judge found that the inclusion 
of the demise clause corroborated the terms of the identity of carrier clause and made it clear 
that the carrier was the shipowner.  
Chadwick LJ also held that this was not a case in which it was “necessary to choose between 
written, stamped or typed words on the one hand and printed text on the other hand.”146 
However, it is respectfully submitted that the learned Judge reconciled the inconsistency 
between the indicators by giving greater weight to the identity of carrier clause and demise 
clause which are in fact printed clauses on a standard form. He construed the inclusion of the 
demise clause as supporting the intention of the parties and as such construed the typed or 
stamped description of CPS as “carrier” to be secondary to the printed demise clause. 
Respectfully, this is in contrast with the principle of construction that written, stamped or 
typed words supersede printed clauses.147 The joint effect of the printed identity of carrier 
clause and the demise clause appeared to be “paramount” even in the face of contrary typed 
wording in the signature box.148 
The above-mentioned principle of construction was also considered by Sir Morritt, V.-C in 
his judgement where he held that another well-established general principle must considered. 
This is the principle that;  
“It is open to the parties to stipulate in their printed conditions of contract that written 
provisions appended to the printed form are not to override, modify or affect in any 
way the application or interpretation of that which is contained in the printed 
conditions, and effect must then be given to such a stipulation even though this is 
contrary to the ordinary rule.”149 
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The Judge held that an examination of the bills of lading in its whole context should be 
construed to mean that the general principle of giving greater weight to written or typed 
words including those in the signature box “is qualified by and to the extent”150 that the 
demise clause applies.151 The words in parenthesis found within the wording of the demise 
clause “notwithstanding anything that appeared to the contrary” brings this second principle 
into operation. The Judge found the conflicting indicator to be the typed words “as carrier” 
describing CPS in the signature box and held that the demise clause was intended to apply 
“notwithstanding those words.”152 The majority for the Court of Appeal accordingly found 
the bills to be shipowner’s bills evidencing the shipowner as contracting carrier. 
 
3.4.3.  The House of Lords 
The House of Lords unanimously overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal and adopted 
a commercial approach to construing the conflicting indicators on the bills when identifying 
the contracting carrier.153 
Lord Bingham at the outset stated that a bill of lading must be viewed as a commercial 
document and that the construction of a commercial document by a court is directly linked to 
“ascertaining and giving effect to the intentions of the parties.”154 The court viewed the issue 
as one of a “contractual interpretation of the bill of lading” - as a commercial document.155 
The House of Lords based their judgments strongly on business sense that must be given to 
commercial documents.156 Lord Bingham found that the dictates of common sense rule that 
“greater weight should attach to terms which the…contracting parties have chosen to include 
in the contract than to pre-printed terms probably devised to cover very many situations to 
which the… contracting parties have never addressed their minds.”157  
In keeping with construing the bill of lading as a whole, the House of Lords found it 
necessary to give effect to the intention of the contracting parties according to the “reasonable 
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expectations of businessmen”158 Lord Bingham emphatically held that a shipper or cargo 
interest would not be expected to refer to “detailed conditions on the back of the bill…until 
reaching [the identity of carrier clause and demise clause]”159 to ascertain who the contracting 
carrier is. Even more so, this cannot be expected where the face of the bill provides a “clear 
and unambiguous statement of who the carrier is.”160 Lord Bingham agreed with the 
judgement of Lord Rix in adopting the principles of common market sense when determining 
the question of the carrier.161 
Lord Steyn concurred with Lord Bingham in adopting the common market sense approach. It 
was reasoned that the bill must be looked at in the way a reasonable person “versed in the 
shipping trade”162 would look at it.163 On the principle of construction that precedence must 
be given to written, typed or stamped words rather than pre-printed conditions on a standard 
form, Lord Steyn took the principle further and stated that a shipper would give “predominant 
effect”164 to the conditions on the face of the bill rather than to the back of the bill.165 The 
House of Lords agreed with Lord Steyn on this point and held that bills of lading must be 
construed “objectively and uniformly”166 and identifying the carrier is to be based on an 
“unequivocal statement on the face of the document.”167 The language on the face of the bill 
was held to take precedence over contradictory provisions on the back of the bill and “no 
attempt at reconciliation is required.”168   
Lord Steyn held that it makes “business common sense”169 that the carrier would be identified 
on the face of the bill, especially by the signature box rather than by conditions set out on the 
bottom of the back of the bill.170  The judgement of the majority in the Court of Appeal was 
criticised by the House of Lords for affording greater weight to “boilerplate clauses”171 on the 
back of the bill rather than to a clear statement on the face of the bill.172 The House of Lords 
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held this to prompt an “unacceptable trap”173 impacting negatively on international shipping 
trade.174 Modern international shipping gives one little time to thoroughly look at the effect of 
printed conditions in small typed words when bills are issued. Lord Hoffman agreed with the 
judgments of his learned colleagues stating that a reasonable reader looking at the face of the 
bill would conclude that CPS, “and only CPS, was accepting liability as carrier.”175 
Additionally, the House of Lords rejected the Court’s reasoning in The Flecha,176 in which 
Justice Moore-Bick found there to be loose usage of the term ‘carrier’ which was not 
unusual.177 In response Lord Hoffman held that “loose usage of a critical expression in the 
bill of lading itself does seem…surprising.”178 
In keeping with viewing bills of lading as commercial documents, the House of Lords 
referred to the UCP 500. It is important to note that bills of lading are addressed to shippers, 
bankers and lawyers, and are transferable to third parties as security for financial credit. The 
House of Lords held that a banker is not expected to examine the contractual conditions in 
tiny print179 on the back of a bill of lading,180  instead, a banker will accept the bill to have 
been issued by the “named carrier”181 on the face of the bill. Article 23(a) of the ICC Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP 500)182 makes it clear that banks will 
decline documents failing to state the name of the carrier on the face of the bill, even if the 
identity of the carrier is provided for on the back of the bill.183 This requirement is in stark 
contrast with the demise clause and identity of carrier clause printed on the back on the bill 
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and identifying the shipowner as the carrier, without naming the specific shipowner.184 
International trade requires prompt decisions and expecting one to view pre-printed 
conditions contained on the back of a bill is “far removed from the real world of 
commerce”.185 
Lord Hobhouse took a different approach to that of his learned colleagues in that whilst the 
House of Lords unanimously afforded greater weight to the provisions on the face of the bill 
rather than to the clauses on the back of the bill, Lord Hobhouse found the signature to play a 
decisive role.186 In his judgement, Lord Hobhouse found the principal fact to be that the 
signature was inconsistent with the form used.187 He held that predominant effect must be 
given to “special words”188 typed, written or stamped in the signature box as it creates a 
“special agreement.”189 This agreement must be given effect to as it demonstrates the 
intention of the parties, and all contradictory clauses will be “overridden.”190 In this way, 
Lord Hobhouse reiterated the reasoning of Colman J and Rix J holding fast to the general 
principle of construction that typed and written provisions (the signature box is surely one 
such) override pre-printed provisions in the case of inconsistency.191 
The cargo owners argued in the alternative that a relationship of agency existed between the 
shipowners and the time charterers in which CPS acted as agent for the shipowner as 
“disclosed but unnamed principal.”192  They argued that the signatures were made for the 
master - that the port agents signed as agents for the time charterer who in turn acted as 
agents for the shipowner thereby lengthening the chain of agency.193 They argued also that 
CPS may have contracted for themselves and for the shipowners, that the description of CPS 
as carrier in the signature box confirmed and gave effect to the demise clause under which 
CPS acted as disclosed agent for the shipowner.194 The House of Lords rejected this 
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submission stating that there was no evidence alluding to “dual liability”195 and that the 
standard provisions provide for a single carrier throughout the bills of lading. 
The House of Lords agreed with the reasoning of Colman J and Rix LJ and held the bills to 
be charterers' bills. 
 
3.5.  Criticism surrounding The Starsin judgement in the House of Lords  
The decision handed down by the House of Lords to a large extent addressed business 
concerns by viewing bills of lading as commercial documents. The House of Lords 
considered the UCP 500’s requirement for the carrier to be named on the face of the bill 
which largely influenced their decision.196 It is important to note that the UCP 500 does not 
comprise domestic or international law, nor is it considered an international convention.197 
Rather, the UCP 500 is a body of rules intended to govern letter of credit transactions in 
international sale contracts.198 It aims to aid bankers, sellers, buyers, lawyers and anyone else 
that may be involved in documentary credit transactions.199 Author Aikens suggests that the 
UCP 500 ought not to influence a determination of the identity of the carrier under a bill of 
lading, which notions a sense of “the tail wagging the dog”200 He adds that the UCP 500 has 
been designed for bankers who view the bill as a document of title and not as a contract. 
Aikens argues that in The Starsin,201 overemphasis was placed on the face of the bill, and that 
this should not be so, since those commercially active are knowledgeable on bills of lading 
and understand that important contractual terms may be contained on the back of the bill.202 
To this end, he argues that distinguishing between two sides of the bill is unneeded.203  
It is also equally important to note that the UCP 500 and now the most recent revision, the 
UCP 600204 though not binding as law, is a set of rules seeking to promote commercial 
certainty for identifying the carrier in clear terms.205 While we cannot rely solely on the 
requirements of the UCP 600 in determining the identity of the carrier, it is submitted that the 
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requirement for the carrier to be clearly named on the face of the bill could lead to a decrease 
in expensive legal disputes206 on the question of the carrier and could promote certainty for 
cargo interests unaware of charterparty terms.207 Author Hill suggests that certainty in 
knowing who the contractual carrier is when issuing a bill of lading will be advantageous to 
all parties involved, including “sellers, buyers, shippers, consignees, agents and negotiating 
banks.”208 A universal acceptance of its terms by the “sea transport community”209 could only 
prove to be beneficial.210 
The decision by the House of Lords was also criticized by Professor Tetley, however on a 
basis different to that of Aikens. Tetley submits that the determination of the carrier should 
not be confined to the possibility of only one carrier.211 He asserts that the carriage of goods 
by sea is a joint venture between the shipowner and charterers as they share the obligations of 
carrier under the Hague-Visby Rules.212 Under a time charterparty, the shipowner and 
charterer share the duties of “loading, carrying, caring for and discharging the cargo” and 
therefore should be held jointly and severally liable as carrier to third parties.213 Also, the 
Hague-Visby Rules render void any clause contained in a contract of carriage that seeks to 
relieve or lessen the liability of a carrier for loss or damage to goods as a result of negligence 
or fault on the part of the carrier in fulfilling its duties and obligations.214 As such, neither the 
shipowner nor the charterer should be able to contract out of their obligations in terms of the 
Hague-Visby Rules.215 Tetley states in this regard, “To allow them to stipulate that one of 
them is not the carrier is the most opprobrious of non-responsibility clauses.”216 He posits 
that the demise clause and identity of carrier clause protects the charterer from any 
responsibility in terms of the Rules, and are therefore “non-responsibility clauses.”217  
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Some scholars in agreement with Tetley have viewed the carriage of goods by sea as a joint 
venture noting that “the time charter is undoubtedly a joint venture in the sense that it is 
composed of acts and operations of both the shipowner and the charterer, who exploit the 
vessel for their joint benefit.”218 However, other scholars while accepting the plausibility of 
there being more than one carrier, have rejected the notion of a time charter being a joint 
venture between shipowner and charterer. Marler notes this view to be “unnecessary and 
wrong.”219  
Furthermore, alluding to a time charter as being a joint venture is very different from what 
was argued by Rix J in the Court of Appeal,220 where it was mentioned as an obiter dictum 
that there may be two carriers within the agency mandate.221 Rix J said that “if the charterer 
has authority to contract on behalf of the shipowner, it may be that the holder of the bill of 
lading can sue the shipowner upon it as an undisclosed principal.”222  
 
3.6.  Conclusion  
The chapter initially looked at domestic legislation governing English maritime law, paying 
particular attention to the development of national legislation in the United Kingdom. The 
British Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971223 enacts the Hague-Visby Rules as a schedule 
and as noted in previous discussions, the Hague-Visby Rules fail to adequately define the 
term “carrier” and therefore provides little help in identifying the carrier under a bill of lading 
subject to the Rules.  
Then the approach historically taken by English Courts on the effectiveness of a demise 
clause contained in a bill of lading in identifying the contracting carrier was discussed. 
Earlier cases such as The Berkshire224 gave effect to the demise clause finding the demise 
clause to reiterate the charterparty provision which entitled charterers and their agents to sign 
bills of lading on the shipowner’s behalf; this was held despite the qualification “for the 
master” being omitted. In signing bills of lading, the charterers were found to act as agents of 
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the shipowners thereby contracting with the shipper on behalf of the shipowners. The 
Rewia225 did not feature the insertion of a demise clause in the bills, but the court found the 
determination of the carrier to be an examination of the construction of the bills in light of the 
surrounding circumstances. The court found that the signature and qualification to the 
signature “for the master” must be afforded greater weight in determining the carrier rather 
than the demise clause. The court in The Flecha226 also found that the bill must be considered 
as a whole viewing the entire matrix of the document in order to properly identify the carrier. 
The signatures on the bill in this case were not sufficient to hold the charterers liable as the 
carrier.  
Lastly, the chapter provided a detailed examination of the reasoning of the courts in The 
Starsin.227 The decision in the House of Lords which is the current position adopted by 
English Courts took on a different approach in identifying the carrier under a bill of lading. 
The court viewed the question of the identity of the carrier as ultimately being a construction 
of the bill as a commercial document. The court noted the importance of commercial sense 
finding that reasonable persons in the shipping trade would look to the front of the bill to 
determine the carrier and not the reverse side of the bill containing the pre-printed demise 
clause. The court found Article 23(a) of the ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credits (UCP 500)228 to support this position.  
Ultimately, the chapter looked at the various criticisms of the House of Lords’ decision 
drawing particular attention for the purposes of subsequent chapters to Professor Tetley’s 
criticism based on his theory of a joint venture between shipowners and charterers to a 
contract of carriage. Tetley rejects the notion of a need to confine the question of the carrier 
to only one carrier. 
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Chapter Four: The identity of the carrier problem under American Law 
 
4.1.  Introduction  
This chapter will focus on the validity of the demise clause and identity of carrier clause 
under bills of lading in American law.  The chapter will examine the approach taken 
historically by American Courts on the validity of the demise clause, and the approach taken 
by the Courts more recently. By so doing, the chapter will draw attention to the lack of 
uniformity in case law on the validity of the demise clause and identity of carrier clause. 
Additionally, the chapter will discuss Professor Tetley’s theory of joint and several liability 
of shipowners and charterers as a means to identifying the carrier. Finally, the chapter will 
examine the multicarrier approach adopted by American Courts as a preferred approach to 
identifying the carrier to a contract of carriage. 
 
4.2.  Statutory law and International Conventions governing the carriage of goods by 
sea in the United States of America  
The United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936(COGSA)1 is applicable to all bills 
of lading, or similar document of title covering a contract of carriage of goods by sea2 “to or 
from ports of the United States in foreign trade.”3 COGSA provides rules that regulate the 
rights and duties of all carriers and shippers that are party to contracts of carriage to or from 
ports of shipment in the United States.4 Where COGSA is applicable to a contract of carriage, 
the Act provides “exclusive remedy”5 with no provision for common law remedies for breach 
of contract, or negligence.6  
COGSA applies to the carriage of goods “from the time when the goods are loaded on to the 
time when they are discharged from the ship.”7 Quite often, however, COGSA will be 
incorporated by reference into contracts of carriage so as to regulate situations beyond its 
scope.8 For example, a period of responsibility clause, which is usually found within the 
paramount clause in a bill of lading, makes COGSA applicable beyond the “tackle to tackle” 
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period in foreign trade.9 In this way, the Act will apply to the  pre-loading and after discharge 
period.10 Many courts have held that the period of responsibility clause in a bill of lading 
gives COGSA precedence over any conflicting U.S domestic law regulating the loading and 
discharging of goods.11 However, the Second Circuit held that a contractual term such as a 
period of responsibility clause which broadens the application of COGSA beyond the “tackle 
to tackle”12 period operates exactly as that -  simply a contractual term,  it does not prevail 
over domestic state law.13 While the courts are divided on this issue, it is an issue that goes 
beyond the scope of the present discussion and will not be discussed further in this paper. 
COGSA expressly provides that its provisions do not apply to charterparties,14 but where bills 
of lading are issued under a charterparty, those bills must comply with the provisions of the 
Act.15 Should the parties to a charterparty wish for COGSA to govern the bills of lading 
issued under the charterparty, an express intention to that effect must be made.16 For 
example, the bill of lading must incorporate the charterparty by a clause in the bill.17 
The Act defines a carrier as including “the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract 
of carriage with the shipper”18 and provides for the carrier’s in personam liability under 
section 1302. A determination of liability for loss or damage to cargo under COGSA as well 
as for breach of contract may be made only against a party who is found to be a carrier in 
terms of the Act.19  
Additionally, section 1303(8) of the Act prohibits any clause in bills of lading that purport to 
exonerate a carrier from liability for loss or damage caused to goods by its negligence or 
fault, or that attempts to lessen a carrier’s liability as provided for in COGSA. As such, any 
term in a bill of lading contravening the provisions of COGSA will be of no effect, null and 
void.20 
                                                            
9
 COGSA 46 U.S. Code Appx. S. 1307. 
10
 COGSA 46 U.S. Code Appx. S. 1307. 
11
 Gebr. Bellmer KG v Terminal Servs. Houston, Inc 711 F. 2d 622, AMC 607 (5 Cir. 1983).  
12
 Colgate Palmolive v. Dart Canada 724 F.2d 313 1984 AMC 305 (2d Cir.1983) at 315. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 COGSA 46 U.S. Code Appx. S. 1305. 
15
 COGSA 46 U.S. Code Appx. S. 1305. 
16
 T J Schoenbaum Admiralty and Maritime Law 4 ed (2004) 682. 
17
 Schoenbaum (note 16 above; 682) 
18
 COGSA 46 U.S.C section 1301(a). 
19
 Schoenbaum (note 16 above; 685). 
20
 A Nakazawa and B A Moghaddam ‘COGSA and Choice of Foreign Law Clauses in Bills of Lading’ (1992) 17 
Tulane Maritime Law Journal 1 at 3-4. 
56 
 
4.3.  The traditional approach taken by American Courts on the validity and 
effectiveness of the demise clause and identity of carrier clause (An analysis of 
case law) 
The demise clause and identity of carrier clause have been given effect to in some cases, and 
in others have been ruled as invalid by different Circuit Courts in the United States.21 The 
question of  the role of the demise clause and/or identity of carrier clause under a bill of 
lading in determining who the carrier is did not feature in American Courts until the decision 
of The Iristo22 in 1941.23 This case initiated almost a decade of approval by American judges 
for the acceptance of the demise clause in bills of lading.24  
In The Iristo,25 the vessel lost its cargo when she sank after she struck an underwater reef off 
the northern west side of Bermuda.26 The vessel was time chartered to Atlantic Maritime 
Corporation who subsequently sub-chartered the vessel to Ocean Dominion Steamship 
Corporation.27 Both charterparties operated on the standard NYPE time charter form.28 
Both time charterparties provided that; 
“The Captain (although appointed by the Owners) shall be under the orders and 
directions of the Charterers as regards employment or agency; and Charterers are to 
load, stow and trim the cargo at their expense under the supervision of the Captain, 
who is to sign Bills of Lading for cargo as presented, in conformity with Mate’s or 
Tally Clerk’s receipts.”29 
 
The cargo was loaded on board the vessel in Canada and the sub-charterers issued bills of 
lading in respect thereof.30 It was found that the master of the vessel also gave written 
authority to the sub-charterers to sign bills of lading on his behalf. The cargo interests sought 
to recover damages for loss of cargo from the sub-charterer (Ocean Dominion Steamship 
Corporation) on the basis that the sub-charterer was the carrier.31 The United States District 
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Court sought to determine whether the sub-charterer was in fact the carrier under the bills of 
lading.32 
Some of the bills issued in respect of the cargo were signed: 
“Ocean Dominion Steamship Corporation, For Master and Owners, By….”  
The signature was signed either by the sub-charterer’s agents or the sub-charterer’s 
employee.33  
The other bills issued were signed: 
“Ocean Dominion Steamship Corporation, By authority of the Master and/or owners 
of the above-mentioned steamer, By…”  
The signature appended was the same on these bills as the others.34 
The court held that “the very language of th[e] signature clearly indicates that the sub-
charterers signed, not as principal, but as agent of the master and/or owner by express 
authority to so sign.”35 The court held further that the clause commonly found in 
charterparties stipulating that “the master shall sign bills of lading…” effectively creates a 
contract with the shipowner and shippers through the master’s signature for the charterer’s 
benefit.36 This does not mean that the master signs as agent for the charterer, but rather, the 
master signs “because he is bound to sign by reason of the charterparty.”37 
The bills of lading also contained a demise clause38 which effectively provided that the 
carrying vessel was not owned by the charterer and that all claims for loss or damage to cargo 
was to be instituted against the vessel itself and/or against the shipowners.39  
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The cargo interests alleged that the demise clause was a tool used by the sub-charterers to 
limit liability as the carrier40 and therefore was null and void under the Hague Rules.41 
However, the court found the demise clause to merely set forth the contractual relationship 
between the parties.42 The court held that the demise clause did not seek to limit the 
charterer’s liabilities as carrier and was found not to be void under the Hague Rules.43 The 
fact that the contract was signed by the sub-charterers as agent for the shipowner, together 
with the inclusion of the demise clause in the bill; demonstrated in clear terms that the 
contract of carriage was one between the shipper and the shipowner “alone.”44 The court held 
that the sub-charterers were not a party to the contract of carriage45 and therefore was not a 
carrier.46 Since the charterer was found not to be a carrier in the first instance, the 
“constrictions” of the Hague Rules did not come into play.47Additionally, the court rejected 
the notion alluded to by the cargo interests that bills of lading are a type of contract which 
allows for both charterer and shipowner to be liable.  
While the court in this case examined the effect of the demise clause under Canadian law, the 
decision did not rely on any distinct point of Canadian law and therefore the judgement 
applies also to the United States adoption of the Hague Rules.48 
This early American decision demonstrates the court’s reliance on the purpose of the demise 
clause and its wording when determining the carrier under a bill of lading,49 finding that the 
demise clause sets out the contractual relationship between the parties.50 This decision differs 
from the English decision The Rewia,51 in which case the court relied extensively on the 
signature and its qualification on the bills when determining the contractual carrier. In The 
Rewia,52 the court focused largely on what it called “the keywords” being “For the Master”53 
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in the bills of lading.54 Even though there was no carrier definition clause nor was there a 
demise clause or an identity of carrier clause contained in the bills, the court held that in 
determining the contracting carrier; greater weight must be afforded to the signature and its 
qualification rather than to other indicators such as a definitions clause, demise clause and/or 
identity of carrier clause.55 
 
4.4.  A deviation from the traditional approach (An analysis of case law) 
Almost a decade after The Iristo,56 American Courts began taking a different approach to the 
validity and effectiveness of the demise clause in bills of lading when determining who is the 
carrier. This differed approach began with the case of Epstein v. United States.57 In this case, 
the vessel S.S Farida was on time charter to United States through the agency of The War 
Shipping Administration.58 The Administration appointed agents through whom the 
Administration “solicited” and obtained”59 cargo for carriage from New York to Havana, and 
issued bills of lading in respect thereof.60 The bills of lading were signed “For the master by 
United Fruit Company as agent for the master”.61 United Fruit Company acted as agent for 
the vessel’s master, and the master acted as agent for the time charterer (The War 
Administration).62 The bills of lading also contained a demise clause. The War 
Administration held itself out to the public as a common carrier for the carriage of goods to 
Havana.63 Some of the cargo was lost during the voyage to Havana64 and the cargo interests 
accordingly sued for loss of cargo.  
The time charterer sought to exonerate itself from liability as carrier by relying on the demise 
clause contained in the bill of lading.65 The court rejected this and held that the demise clause 
was invalid because of its second sentence which constituted “an effort to relieve the carrier 
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of liability for its fault; i.e. failure to deliver”66 contravening Sections 1303(2) and 1303(8) of 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.67 The court also found the demise clause to be invalid on 
another basis, that being that the time charterparty provided no authority for the time 
charterer to contract on behalf of the shipowner,68 and that even if such authority did exist, 
“that authority is for ordinary bills of lading and not to contract upon the owner’s liabilities 
properly devolving upon others.”69 Clancy DJ found that the Administration was 
“disingenuous” in its attempt of using the demise clause to claim that the contract was 
between the shipowner and shipper.70 The demise clause was held to be “a fraud on the 
shipper and conveys a false warranty of authority to contract.”71 Accordingly, the court found 
the time charterer liable as carrier. With this decision, the Southern District Court of New 
York disregarded its previous holding72 in the case of The Iristo.73 
Scholar Pritchett suggests that the court’s finding in Epstein v United States74 on the 
invalidity of the demise clause as an attempt to avoid or limit liability in contravention of 
COGSA, should be assessed in line with the court’s holding75 in Pendleton v Benner Line.76 
In that case, Benner Line hired space on a vessel for the carriage of cargo as the voyage 
charterer.77 The court held that since the charter was not a demise charter, it is presumed, 
(and the bill of lading supports this fact); that the goods fell into the possession of the 
shipowners since the vessel remained in possession of the shipowners.78 This would lead one 
to presume that the shipowner is the carrier. However, the court found that: 
“Benner Line held itself out to the public as a common carrier, solicited and received 
the merchandise… [and] by acceptance of such merchandise contracted to be 
answerable for the transportation, chartered the vessels to carry what it received… 
fixed and received the freight and signed or had the bills of lading signed in its 
office.”79 
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Therefore, Pritchett argues, that where the charterer solicits a cargo as a common carrier and 
enters into “an independent pre-bill of lading contract”80 with a shipper; that charterer is held 
to be the carrier. The subsequent issuance of a bill of lading containing a demise clause which 
evidences such contract will prove insufficient as an attempt by the charterer to avoid liability 
as carrier for loss or damage to the cargo.81 This is the case whether the voyage in question is 
governed by COGSA or not.82  
Pritchett argues that the governing factor then is the solicitation of cargo by the charterer, for 
instance by holding itself out to be a common carrier.83 Where an independent contract 
between the charterer and shipper does not exist, the demise clause would be valid in its 
purpose of identifying the contractual parties especially the carrier.84 In such a case, the 
charterer cannot be found to be the carrier since the charterer is not party to the contract of 
carriage at all.85  
Pritchett suggests that the demise clause is not always invalid as was held in Epstein v United 
States.86 In that case the Administration (the time charterer) held itself out to the public as a 
common carrier and entered into an independent contract with the shipper before issuance of 
the bills of lading. As such, the demise clause could not be valid since it sought to exonerate 
the charterer of its rightful carrier liability. 87 
 
4.5.  The demise clause and identity of carrier clause viewed in light of statutory law 
American Courts have taken a dim view to the demise clause and identity of carrier clause 
when considered in terms of statutory law. For example, in the case of Blanchard Luber Co. 
v. SS Anthony II,88 the court held the demise clause to be invalid under COGSA’s predecessor 
the Harter Act.89 The District Court of New York held that the demise clause sought to 
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insulate the charterer from liability in direct contravention of Section 1 of the Harter Act.90 
This section prohibits clauses in bills of lading which purport to “relieve managers, agents, 
masters, or owners from liability for loss or damage to cargo resulting from negligence, fault 
or failure to load, stow, care and properly deliver the cargo.” In addition, the court held, that 
even before the existence of the Harter Act, judicial authority provided that common carriers 
may not be insulated from their liability “by any declaration or stipulation that they should 
not be considered such carriers.”91 
A recent decision by the United States Fifth Circuit invalidated the demise clause on the same 
basis; being that the clause functioned as an attempt to avoid or lessen a carrier’s liability in 
contravention of section 1303(8) of COGSA.92 In Thyssen Steel Co v M/V Kavo Yerakas,93 
cargo interests Thyssen Steel Company and Associated Metals and Minerals Corporation 
entered into a contract of carriage with Eurolines for the shipment of steel pipes from Europe 
to the United States on board the vessel M/V Yerakas.94 At the time of shipment, the vessel 
was on time charter to Eurolines by shipowner Dodekaton.95 Bills of lading were issued and 
signed “for the master” by the time charterer’s agents.96 Cargo interests instituted action 
against the vessel in rem, against the shipowner Dodekaton and against Eurolines the time 
charterer for damage caused to the cargo allegedly occurring during transit.97 
Clause 8 of the time charterparty stated that: 
The Captain (although appointed by the Owners), is solely under the orders and 
directions of the Charterers as regards employment and agency; and Charterers are to 
load, stow, trim, lash, dunnage, secure, tally and discharge the cargo at their expense 
under the supervision, directions and responsibility of the Captain, who is to sign Bills 
of Lading for cargo as presented, in conformity with Mate’s or Tally Clerk’s receipts. 
 
The issue before the court was whether the shipowner was a carrier under COGSA.98 In 
examining this issue, the court stated that to recover damages under COGSA, it must be 
established by the cargo owner that there was a contract of carriage between itself and the 
                                                            
90
 The Harter Act of 1893. 
91
 Bank of Kentucky vs. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174, 181 (1876). 
92
 Tetley (note 45 above; 606). 
93
 Thyssen Steel Co. v. M/V Kavo Yerakas, 50 F.3d 1349 (5 Cir. 1995). 
94
 Thyssen Steel Co. supra note 93 at 1351.  
95
 Thyssen Steel Co. supra note 93 at 1351. 
96
 Thyssen Steel Co. supra note 93 at 1351. 
97
 Thyssen Steel Co. supra note 93 at 1351. 
98
 Thyssen Steel Co. supra note 93 at 1351. 
63 
 
shipowner or charterer.99 The court found that the shipowner was not party to the contract of 
carriage since the master acted as agent for the time charterer and was given no authority by 
the shipowner to issue bills of lading on the shipowner’s behalf. 100 
The court referred to the identity of carrier clauses and the demise clause as clauses that 
attempt to avoid or lessen a party’s COGSA liability.101 The court held that liability may not 
be determined at the discretion of the parties but rather by reference to the statute, i.e. 
COGSA.102 The Act specifically renders void any clause that seeks to relieve or lessen the 
liability of a carrier for loss or damage to goods due to negligence or fault on the part of the 
carrier in fulfilling its duties and obligations.103 The court held the demise clause and identity 
of carrier clause to be void under Section 1303(8) of the Act. 
 
4.6.  A lack of uniformity in judicial decisions on the validity and effectiveness of the 
demise clause  
The court’s reasoning in Thyssen Steel Co v M/V Kavo Yerakas however, has not always been 
followed by American Courts. While some American Courts have attributed blanket 
invalidity to the demise clause for contravening statutory law, other American Courts have in 
certain instances validated the demise clause and identity of carrier clause based on other 
grounds.104 
A case in point is Recovery Services International v. S/S Tatiana L.105 In this case, shipowner 
Elprogreso Incorporated entered into a time charter with Saudi International Shipping 
company on the NYPE form.106 The charterparty agreement contained interlineations and 
rider clauses.107 The charterparty contained the standard provisions of the NYPE standard 
time charter form, for example, paragraph 8 of the charterparty authorised the Captain “to 
sign Bills of Lading for cargo as presented with Mate’s or Tally Clerk’s receipts,” and 
referred to paragraph 42 which provided that: 
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“[t]he Master [is] to issue Bills of Lading for all cargoes carried under this Charter 
Party, if required by the Charterers and without prejudice to the terms and conditions 
of the Charter Party. Charterers and/or their agents are authorised to issue Bills of 
Lading on Owners’/Master’s behalf according to the Mate’s receipts.”108 
 
At the port of loading, the master wrote letters to Biehl Incorporated who acted as agents for 
the time charterer’s affiliate company Saudi-U.S. Line, stipulating that Biel was authorised 
according to paragraph 42 of the charterparty, to sign bills of lading on behalf of the 
master.109  
Mate’s receipts for the goods on board clearly indicated that certain cargo was “bleeding” 
while others were “stained with flour” and torn. Regardless of this fact, Biehl Incorporated 
issued bills of lading on the forms of Saudi-U.S. Line stating the cargo to be “Certified 
Loaded Clean on Board.” The bills were signed “For the Carrier: BIEHL & CO., INC. 
General Agent, FOR SAUDI-U.S. LINE.”110 
The vessel S/S Tatiana L arrived in Saudi Arabia and certain cargo was reported as non-
delivered while others were lost or damaged. Recovery Services International as subrogee of 
the consignee instituted action against the shipowner amongst other defendants to recover 
damages in respect of the cargo. The issue before the court was whether the shipowner was a 
COGSA carrier. 
The shipowner Elprogreso argued that it cannot be a carrier under COGSA since the bills of 
lading were issued on Saudi-U. S Line forms, a company affiliated with the time charterer 
and were signed “for Saudi-U. S Line” by Biehl Incorporated.111 They argued that a 
shipowner is exculpated from in personam liability where bills of lading were signed by the 
time charterer in a “non-representative capacity”, that being that the bills were not in fact 
signed for the master and thereby not binding on the shipowner.112 The shipowner alleged 
that the bills were signed for Saudi-U. S. Line.113  
Cargo interests alleged that despite the qualification of the signature by Biehl Incorporated 
stating ‘For the Carrier, For Saudi- U. S. Line,’ the identity of carrier clause found in 
                                                            
108
 Recovery Services International v. S/S Tatiana L supra note 105 at 2. 
109
 Recovery Services International v. S/S Tatiana L supra note 105 at 2. 
110
 Recovery Services International v. S/S Tatiana L supra note 105 at 2. 
111
 Recovery Services International v. S/S Tatiana L supra note 105 at 3. 
112
 Recovery Services International v. S/S Tatiana L supra note 105 at 3. 
113
 Recovery Services International v. S/S Tatiana L supra note 105 at 3. 
65 
 
paragraph 17 of the bill of lading indicated that the signature by Biehl Incorporated was made 
on behalf of the shipowner.  
The identity of carrier clause read as follows: 
“The Contract evidenced by this Bill of Lading is between the Merchant and the 
Owner of the vessel named herein (or substitute) and it is therefore agreed that said 
Shipowner only shall be liable for any damage or loss due to any breach or non-
performance of any obligation arising out of the contract of carriage, whether or not 
relating to the vessel's seaworthiness. 
“It is further understood and agreed that as the Line, Company or Agents who has 
executed this Bill of Lading for and on behalf of the Master is not a principal in the 
transaction, said Line, Company or Agent shall not be under any liability arising out 
of the contract of carriage, nor as Carrier nor bailee of the goods.” 
 
 
The court agreed that the terms of the identity of carrier clause subjected the shipowner to in 
personam liability as carrier since it provides that the contract of carriage is with the 
shipowner and the shipper.114 The clause effectively provided that Biehl Incorporated acted 
only as agent for the shipowner.115 However, the court held that the provisions of the clause 
were “wholly inconsistent”116 with all other terms on the bill of lading. The bill appeared on 
Saudi – U. S. Line’s printed form, was signed “for Saudi- U. S. Line”  and did not contain the 
shipowner’s name anywhere on the bill.117 These facts, the court held, made it unreasonable 
for the “fine print”118 contained in the identity of carrier clause to impose carrier liability on 
the shipowner. 
The shipowner proceeded to argue that the identity of carrier clause in a bill of lading is void 
as a matter of law.119 In support of its contention, the shipowner relied on cases in which it 
was held that time charterers may not rely on such clauses as an attempt to shift liability to a 
shipowner.120 The idea was that since the time charterer executes the bills of lading, it may 
not “unilaterally” shift its liability to the shipowner.121 In this regard, the court held that the 
present case differed from those cases since those cases found the identity of carrier clause to 
be invalid where the time charterer by relying on the identity of carrier clause attempted to 
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shift its liability to the shipowners.122 The present case involved the shipper and not the time 
charterer attempting to rely on the identity of carrier clause and the court saw no reason why 
the shipper should be prevented from doing so in order to render the shipowner liable.123 
Tetley asserts that the reasoning of the court in this decision took on the contra 
proferentem124 rule of construction.125  
The above analysis of case law demonstrates that most American Courts faced with the issue 
of determining the effectiveness and validity of the demise clause and identity of carrier 
clause in a bill of lading have held these clauses to constitute an attempt by a party to 
exonerate itself of carrier liability contrary to the provisions of COGSA;126 while some 
American Courts have given effect to the demise clause and identity of carrier clause in a bill 
of lading. Tetley asserts that these clauses are a “subterfuge”127 of charterers who hold onto it 
as non-responsibility clauses to evade liability as carriers. They do this notwithstanding their 
clear duties as carriers under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules which apply a matter of 
public order.128 
 
4.7.  The concept of joint and several liability of the shipowner and charterer in a 
contract of carriage 
The general approach is that there can be only one contractual carrier to a contract of 
carriage, that being the owner or the charterer but not both. However, another approach 
adopted by American Courts in determining the contractual carrier is the concept of joint and 
several liability of a shipowner and a charterer under a bill of lading.129 This approach has 
been labelled an “American-influenced principle”130 since United States Courts have 
welcomed the concept that there may be more than one party held to be the COGSA 
carrier.131 In support of this approach, Tetley asserts that the carriage of goods by sea 
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constitutes a “joint venture” between the shipowner and charterer since shipowners and 
charterers are “bound together by contract”132 and share the duties of a carrier under the 
Hague and Hague-Visby Rules; which duties may not be contracted out of.133 Tetley asserts 
that the inclusion of a demise clause and/or identity of carrier clause in a bill of lading 
operates to exonerate charterers from their carrier liability under contracts of carriage,134 even 
though charterers are thoroughly involved in the “loading, discharging, and trimming of 
cargo.”135 He labels such clauses “non-responsibility clauses”136 which violate the 
“mandatory nature and public order” of the Hague/Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules, and 
COGSA.137 
In determining the contractual carrier, American Courts have traditionally followed the 
principles of agency law, that is, whether or not apparent or implied authority existed when 
the charterer issued and signed a bill of lading.138 Where a charterer or his agent signs “for 
the master” with authority from the shipowner, the shipowner will be held as a COGSA 
carrier.139 However if the charterer’s signature “for the master” was not authorised by the 
shipowner, the shipowner will not be bound as a COGSA carrier since he did not become 
party to the contract of carriage.140 It is important to note that a signature signed “for the 
master” is not attributed the same weight in American Courts as it is in English Courts.141 
In contrast to the “agency approach,”142 Tetley’s joint venture approach provides that bills of 
lading issued by the charterer on the charterer’s form and signed “for the master” may be 
binding on the charterer who will be liable along with the shipowner as a contracting 
carrier.143 In addition, he asserts that a charterer who does not issue bills of lading, but who 
assumes responsibilities under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules such as loading, stowing, 
discharging and care for cargo, may also be liable as a carrier.144  
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4.8.  The multicarrier approach/ The practical approach  
American courts have gone even further than joint and several liability by adopting a 
multicarrier approach.145 According to this approach, a determination of who the contracting 
party to a bill of lading is, be it the shipowner or the charterer, is not the deciding factor when 
determining the COGSA carrier.146 The courts have reasoned that the wording in the 
definition of carrier under COGSA “includes the owner or the charterer,”147 must be taken to 
include “all owners and charterers involved in the carriage of goods at issue.”148 This 
approach has often been termed the ‘practical approach’ since it looks not only at who issued 
or authorised the bill of lading but it looks also at all parties actually involved in the carriage 
of goods under the contract.149 These parties are considered to be carriers and are accordingly 
liable for those parts of the carriage they performed.150 Tetley asserts that this practical 
approach is actually what he describes as the joint venture of shipowners and charterers to the 
carriage of goods.151 The multicarrier approach infers that there may be more than one carrier 
to a contract of carriage and that a carrier may be a party other than the owner or charterer 
having issued the bill of lading.152  
In Joo Seng Hong Kong Co., Ltd v. S.S Unibulkfir,153 a case in which the demise clause was 
not contained in the bill of lading, the Southern District Court of New York held that:154 
“Although decisions [seek] to justify the imposition of COGSA carrier liability by 
finding specific evidence of a ‘contract of carriage’ between the charterer or owner 
and the cargo interest involved, there is strong statutory support for treating, except in 
exceptional situations, all owners and charterers involved in the carriage of goods at 
issue as COGSA carriers who are potentially liable to cargo interests under the bill of 
lading.” 
 
The court in Joo Seng Hong Kong v. S.S. Unibulkfir noted that charterers or owners  who 
have not signed bills of lading and who have not in any way contributed to its issuance can 
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still be found liable as COGSA carriers.155  It was held that the imposition of liability under 
COGSA is wide enough to include numerous parties involved in the shipment and handling 
of the cargo.156 This ‘practical approach’ of holding all shipowners and charterers to be 
carriers was held to be in keeping with COGSA’s goal of “alleviating the Congressionally 
perceived imbalance of bargaining power between carriers and cargo interests.”157 The New 
York and New Jersey Courts have adopted this expansive view to the multicarrier approach 
and have found no trouble in imposing carrier liability to multiple parties involved in the 
carriage process even in the absence of a link between the owner, charterer or other party and 
the bill of lading, for example, a link such as the requirement for privity of contract.158 
A recent case in point is Central National – Gottesman Inc v M.V Gertrude Oldenforff,159 in 
which case the United States District Court, New York held that; in determining who 
qualifies as the carrier within the meaning of section 1302 of COGSA, the district courts have 
interpreted the term expansively to include all owners and charterers to the carriage of goods. 
The court referred to Joo Seng Hong Kong Co Ltd v S.S. Unifbulkfir,160 which decision led to 
numerous courts within the district to viewing the definition of ‘carrier’ as all-encompassing 
of parties who did not issue the bill of lading. 
Author Schoenbaum adopts a positive view to the multicarrier approach and argues that the 
“tangle of relationships between parties” render the principles of agency insufficient to 
determine the contracting carrier.161 He asserts that: 
 “[the] doctrine that all parties involved in the carriage of goods are COGSA carriers 
eliminates the initial skirmishing over the identity of the carrier issue and brings all 
relevant parties before the court where the ultimate allocation of responsibility for the 
loss can be ascertained. If COGSA liability is found, the loss can be apportioned 
among those found to be carriers based upon several considerations… This way of 
handling the identity of the carrier issue protects the shipper yet apportions liability 
fairly between the responsible parties.”162 
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A case clearly demonstrating the “tangled web of relationships”163 between parties is 
Hyundai Corp., U.S.A v. Hull Insurance Proceeds of the M/V Vulca.164 Here the agency 
approach proved inadequate in determining the contractual carrier and the multicarrier 
approach was therefore adopted. 
In this case, Merchant Marine entered into a voyage charterparty with shipper Clarendon Ltd 
which provided for Merchant Marine as voyage charterer to arrange for the carriage of the 
shipper’s cargo from New Jersey in the United States to Inchon, South Korea.165 Merchant 
Marine subsequently entered into a time charterparty with Vulcan Navigation Corporation, 
the owner of the vessel Vulca, for the shipment of goods under the contract of carriage 
between Merchant Marine and Clarendon.166 
The time charter provided that: 
“The Captain (although appointed by the Owners), shall be under the orders and 
direction of the Charterers as regards employment and agency; and Charterers are to 
load, stow, discharge and trim the cargo at their expense under the supervision of the 
Captain, who is to sign Bills of Lading… 
However, at Charterer’s option, Charterers or their agents may sign Bills of Lading on 
behalf of the Master… [T]he Charterers shall indemnify the Owners against all 
consequences or liabilities that may arise from any inconsistency between this Charter 
and any Bills of Lading signed by the Charterers or their agent.” 
 
The master of the vessel gave written authority to port agents Overseas Shipping Inc, who 
had been chosen by the shipper, to sign and issue bills of lading in respect of the cargo 
shipped.167 Overseas Shipping subsequently signed the bill of lading on the master’s behalf, 
and the master stated that he acted as agent for the shipowner of the Vulca alone.168 
The vessel sank during the final leg of its voyage to Korea and cargo was lost. Third party 
consignee Hyundai and cargo underwriter Inchon Iron & Steel instituted action against the 
shipowner and time charterer Merchant Marine for loss of cargo.169 
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The issue before the court was whether the time charterer was liable for loss of the cargo as 
COGSA carrier under the contract of carriage. In its discussion, the court noted that a 
contract of carriage in the form of a charterparty between the carrier and shipper is 
considered to be private carriage to which COGSA will not apply.170 However, a ‘Clause 
Paramount’ may be included within the charterparty stipulating that “COGSA will apply to 
bills of lading issued pursuant to the charterpart[y].”171 In this case, both the time charterparty 
and the voyage charterparty contained such Clauses Paramount.  
The court first applied the ‘agency test’ to determine whether the time charterer was a 
COGSA carrier and examined various factors of the contract of carriage.172 The first factor 
was “whether the time charterer was authorised to issue bills of lading” 173 and the answer 
was yes. However, this factor could not determine whether the time charterer was a COGSA 
carrier. The second factor the court looked at was “who signed the bill of lading.” The court 
found the bill to have been signed by a port agent authorised to do so by the master of the 
vessel. However, the master might have been given authority to issue bills of lading from the 
shipowner and the time charterer. Therefore, this factor too could not be decisive.174 
The third factor was “whose form was used in the bill of lading,” and in this case the bill was 
issued neither on the time charterer’s form nor on the shipowner’s form. The court proceeded 
to assess the last and most significant factor, that being, “who authorised the bill of 
lading.”175  
In supports of its allegation that the shipowner authorised the bill of lading, the time charterer 
cited a certificate by the Master in which the master stated that any bill signed was signed on 
behalf of the master of the ship so as to bind the shipowner.176 The court then had to deal with 
the significant question of whether the master could also issue or sign bills of lading on 
behalf of the time charterer.177 The master stated that he did not “recall” being granted 
authority by the time charterer to issue bills of lading on the charterer’s behalf. However, the 
time charterparty between the shipowner and time charterer allowed for the time charterer to 
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issue bills of lading. The court held that these facts must be weighed against the master’s 
“recollection”, which is not a task to be done by the court. The court held that as a matter of 
law, Merchant Marine, the time charterer did issue the bill of lading.178 
The court then turned to an application of the ‘practical test’ in which there may be more than 
one COGSA carrier under a bill of lading.179 The court held that under this test, if it cannot be 
proved by cargo interests that the time charterer authorised the issuance of the bill of lading, 
it may be shown that the time charterer is a COGSA carrier by proving that, “Merchant 
Marine was involved in transporting the cargo, and was part of actions that led to the loss of 
cargo.”180 The court found that the cargo interests clearly established this. It was shown that 
Merchant Marine as time charterer of the vessel also undertook a voyage charter relationship 
with shipper Claredon, thereby becoming involved in the “instant voyage.”181 The court 
found that this practical test and the goal of COGSA is to give shippers “a broad array” of 
defendants against whom to bring suit.182 The court held, that a defendant who is not a party 
to the bill of lading, but who was involved in the issuance of the bill, or in the loading of the 
goods, or who is shown to have participated in the loss of cargo, is a carrier under COGSA.183 
The matter was subsequently allowed to proceed to trial and the time charterer’s motion 
summary was denied.184  It is noteworthy to mention that judgements adopting the 
multicarrier approach have often come up in cases of motions to dismiss or motions for 
summary judgment.185  
It is important to note that while the multicarrier approach is applied expansively in the lower 
courts, it is followed in the Courts of Appeal narrowly within the framework of the 
requirement of privity of contract. The United States Courts of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit 
requires privity of contract of carriage before COGSA liability may arise.186 As such, the 
multicarrier approach may be adopted and both a shipowner and a charterer may be held as 
carriers under COGSA where the charterer signs a bill of lading “for the master” and so signs 
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by authority of the shipowner, thus making both shipowner and charterer parties to the 
contract of carriage.187  
A case demonstrating this is Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. M/V Gloria.188 In this case, the 
shipper Cargill Inc contracted to sell soybean meal to some parties in Costa Rica, these 
parties constituted the consignees and receivers of cargo.189 The shipper instructed Greenwich 
to find a vessel to carry the goods from New Orleans to Puerto Limon, Costa Rica.190 
Subsequently, Greenwich entered into a voyage charter with Transportacion Maritima 
Mexica, S.A. (TMM) for carriage of the cargo on board the M/V Gloria.191 The vessel was on 
time charter to Transportacion Maritima Mexica, S.A. The cargo was loaded by stevedores 
Rogers Terminal at the port of shipment and bills of lading were issued and signed: ROGERS 
TERMINAL & SHIPPING CORPORATION, AS AGENTS BY AUTHORITY OF THE 
MASTER. The bills incorporated the provisions of the voyage charterparty and stipulated 
that COGSA applied to the bills.192 Upon discharge in Costa Rica, it was discovered that the 
goods were slack and short, and the bags were wet and torn193. The cargo owners as well as 
the cargo underwriter Pacific Employers brought an action against the vessel M/V Gloria, the 
shipowner Aquarius Ltd, and the time charterers TMM.194 One of the issues before the Fifth 
Circuit was whether the district court erred in its finding that the shipowner and the time 
charterer were carriers under COGSA and that the voyage charterer was not a carrier.195  
The district court found that in issuing the bills of lading, Rogers Terminal issued and signed 
the bills as agents for the time charterer since the time charterer was a party to the contract of 
carriage.196 The time charterers argued that this finding was incorrect, and that Rogers 
Terminal did not act on their behalf. The voyage charterparty incorporated into the bills 
provided for the voyage charterer to “appoint” and “employ” stevedores at the port of 
loading.197 The charterparty also stipulated that the time charterer and/or its agents were 
responsible for issuing bills of lading.198 The voyage charter also provided that the time 
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charterer would issue bills upon payment of freight by the voyage charterer. Based on these 
provisions, the district court found that Rogers Terminal issued and signed bills of lading as 
agent for the time charterer.199 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court and found that 
the time charterer was a party to the contract of carriage and was therefore a COGSA 
carrier.200 
The court then turned to the issue of whether the shipowner was a carrier under COGSA. The 
court stated that the shipowner’s liability is determined by the qualification of the signature 
“by authority of the master.”201 This means that what must be determined is whether Rogers 
Terminal issued and signed the bills with the authority of the shipowner to sign on behalf of 
the master and thus on the behalf of the shipowner.202 The rules of agency dictate that if a bill 
is signed by the charterer or its agent “for the master” with the authority of the shipowner, the 
shipowner then falls within the provisions of COGSA and is bound by the Act.203 However, if 
a bill is signed by a charterer or its agent “for the master” without the authority of the 
shipowner, the shipowner cannot be held to be a COGSA carrier and will not be bound.204 
In determining this question, the court found, based on evidence by the master, that the 
master authorised Rogers Terminal to sign the bills of lading.205 Also, the time charterparty 
provided in Clause 8 that: 
“The Captain (although appointed by the Owners), shall be under the orders and 
orders and directions of the Charterers [TMM] as regards employment and agency; … 
the Captain, who is to sign Bills of Lading for cargo as presented, in conformity with 
Mate’s or Tally’s Clerk’s receipts.” 
 
Additionally, a rider clause inserted into the charterparty under Rider 37 provided that: 
“If required by Charterers and/or their Agents, Master to authorise Charterers or their 
Agents to sign Bills of Lading on his behalf in accordance with mates and/or tally 
clerks receipt without prejudice to this Charter Party.” 
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The court found that this rider clause enabled the master to bind the shipowner by giving 
authority to the time charterer’s agent to sign bills of lading.206 As such, the shipowner was 
bound to the contract of carriage since the time charterer was authorised to sign bills “for the 
master” binding the master and thereby binding the shipowner. The shipowner was found to 
be a COGSA carrier.207 The court held that the time charterer and the shipowner were parties 
to the contract of carriage with the shipper, and as such were both carriers under COGSA.  
The cargo interests alleged that the voyage charterer was also a COGSA carrier since it 
undertook responsibility for “loading, stowage and discharge of the goods,”208 duties which 
COGSA imputes upon a carrier.209 However, the court held that this fact alone could not 
cause the voyage charterer to be held as a carrier.210 The court concluded that Greenwich, the 
voyage charterer, did not enter into a contract of carriage and could not be a carrier under 
COGSA.211  
 
4.9.  Conclusion  
This chapter examined the validity of the demise clause under bills of lading in American 
Courts. The chapter demonstrated the lack of uniformity in American Courts on the issue of 
the validity and effect of the demise clause in American maritime law especially when 
viewed in light of domestic law and international conventions. 
At the outset, the provisions of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936 were 
discussed, particularly noting that the Act applies to all bills of lading covering a contract of 
carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in foreign trade.212 Notably, the 
provisions of the Act do not apply to charterparties; for the Act to apply to bills of lading 
issued under a charterparty, an express intention must be made that COGSA shall govern the 
bills and contract of carriage. The Act defines a carrier as including “the owner or the 
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charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with the shipper”213 The Act also prohibits 
any clause in bills of lading seeking to exonerate or lessen a carrier’s liability,214  effectively 
mirroring Article 3(8) of the Hague-Visby Rules.  
The chapter examined The Iristo,215 in which case emerged the issue of the role of the demise 
clause in identifying the carrier under a bill of lading. This case led to almost a decade of 
acceptance by the courts of the demise clause in bills of lading. In this case, the court found 
the demise clause was simply a tool setting forth the contractual relationship between the 
parties. The demise clause was therefore not a means to limiting the charterer’s liability and 
therefore was not void under the Hague Rules.  
However, a decade later, American Courts began taking the stance that the demise clause was 
invalid for contravening the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.216 Going further, 
the court in Epstein v. United States217 held the demise clause to convey to a shipper and third 
party holder a “false warranty”218 of authority by the time charterer to contract for the 
shipowner.  
The invalidity of the demise clause because of its inconsistency with domestic legislation has 
been hammered down in many early cases such as Blanchard Luber Co. v. SS Anthony II,219 
and Thyssen Steel Co v M/V Kavo Yerakas,220 
Following the lack of uniformity in judicial decisions, Recovery Services International v. S/S 
Tatiana L221 presented a resurrection in the validity of the demise clause albeit subtly. In this 
case the demise clause was rendered ineffective for being wholly inconsistent with all other 
provisions in the bill, but the court did not render the demise clause invalid. The court 
recognised that a shipper or third party consignee may rely on the demise clause so as to 
render the shipowner liable for loss or damage to goods, since the shipper does not act as a 
charterer would in relying on the demise clause as an attempt to shift liability to the 
shipowner. 
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The findings of this chapter demonstrate the great need in American Courts for unification on 
the validity or invalidity of the demise clause under bills of lading. In an attempt to navigate 
some uniformity on the validity of the demise clause and the question of identifying the 
carrier under a bill of lading, the chapter discusses Professor Tetley’s concept of joint and 
several liability between shipowners and charterers. Whilst American law has traditionally 
followed principles of agency providing for only one carrier to a contract of carriage, in 
recent times American Courts have welcomed the concept of joint and several liability 
between shipowners and charterers to a contract of carriage. Additionally, American Courts 
have taken a step further and adopted the multicarrier approach. The courts have reasoned 
that the wording in the definition of carrier under COGSA “includes the owner or the 
charterer,”222 must be taken to include “all owners and charterers involved in the carriage of 
the goods at issue.”223 The multicarrier approach looks not only at who issued or authorised 
the bill of lading but it looks also at all parties actually involved in the carriage of goods 
under the contract.224 These parties are considered to be carriers and are accordingly liable for 
those parts of the carriage for which they performed.225 This approach has been adopted all-
embracingly in the lower courts226 imposing carrier liability on multiple parties even in the 
absence of a link between the owner, charterer or other party and the bill of lading (such as 
the link of the requirement of privity of contract). However, in the Courts of Appeal the 
multicarrier approach has been applied restrictedly within the ambit of the requirement of 
privity of contract as was demonstrated in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. M/V Gloria.227 
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Chapter Five: The identity of the carrier problem under Canadian Law  
 
5.1.  Introduction 
This chapter will first look at the national legislation and international convention regulating 
the carriage of goods by sea in Canadian maritime law. Thereafter the chapter seeks to 
analyse the original position taken by Canadian Courts on the validity of the demise clause 
and the notion of joint and several liability between shipowners and time charterers. The 
chapter will then examine the current position taken by the Federal Court of Appeal in 
upholding the validity of the demise clause under a bill of lading and further, will assess the 
present approach taken by the Courts on the joint venture theory postulated by Professor 
Tetley.  
 
5.2.  Statutory law and International Conventions governing the carriage of goods by 
sea in Canada 
International trade in Canada, particularly the international carriage of goods by sea, is 
regulated by the Canadian Marine Liability Act.1 The Marine Liability Act consolidates 
numerous international conventions and marine liability regimes into one statute.2 Part V 
incorporating by reference the Hague-Visby Rules3 in Schedule 3 of the Act regulates 
liability in respect of the carriage of goods by sea in Canadian law.4 It is noteworthy to 
mention that Canada has not ratified the Hague-Visby Rules. Part V of the Marine Liability 
Act5 contains the legislation formerly governing the carriage of goods by sea in Canada 
namely the Carriage of Goods by Water Act of 1993.6 The Marine Liability Act applies to all 
contracts of carriage evidenced by a bill of lading regulating the relationship between the 
carrier and holder of the bill for the carriage of outbound shipments of cargo from Canada to 
other nations.7 The Rules will not apply where a contract of carriage is regulated by a foreign 
law which has not acceded to the Hague-Visby Rules or where the Hamburg Rules apply to 
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the contract of carriage.8 Where a contract of carriage is not governed by the Act 
incorporating the Hague-Visby Rules as a force of law, the common law principles of 
Canadian Maritime law will be enforced through which the principles of freedom of contract 
will be adopted.9 
 
5.3.  The traditional approach taken by Canadian Courts on the validity and 
effectiveness of the demise clause and identity of carrier clause (An analysis of 
case law) 
Canadian maritime law concerning the validity and effect of the demise clause and identity of 
carrier clause has differed vastly over a number of judicial decisions.10 The first of these 
cases to be mentioned is the early decision of Canadian Klockner v. D/S A/S Flint (The 
Mica).11 In this case, cargo interests instituted action against both the shipowner and the time 
charterer of the vessel.12 The charterer argued that as a result of the demise clause contained 
in the bill of lading, he was excluded from liability as carrier.13 Here, the Federal Court found 
the demise clause to be invalid for its inconsistency with Article 3(8) of the Hague Rules 
which prohibits any clause seeking to relieve the carrier from its liability.14 As such, the court 
allowed the action against the charterer.15  
Similarly, in Carling O’Keefe Breweries v. C.N. Marine,16 the court was confronted with the 
issue of whether the time charterer was the carrier under the bill of lading. In this case, the 
court held that in determining the carrier to a contract of carriage evidenced by a bill of 
lading, it is vital to examine the language of the bill and to analyse the construction of the 
bill.17  
It was argued for the time charterer that it was not a party to the contract of carriage and 
could not be found as the carrier since the contract of carriage was between the shipowner 
                                                            
8
 Colford D (note 7 above; 5 – 6).   
9
 Colford D (note 7 above; 6).  
10
 V Rochester The Lone “Carrier” An Analysis of the Implications of the General Reluctance to Hold Parties 
Involved in Sea Carriage Jointly and Severally Liable (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2005) 
41. 
11
 Canadian Klockner v. D/S A/S Flint [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 478. 
12
 W Tetley Marine Cargo Claims 4 ed (2008) Vol 2: 622. 
13
 Tetley (note 12 above; 622).  
14
 Tetley (note 12 above; 622).  
15
 Tetley (note 12 above; 622).  
16
 Carling O’Keefe Breweries v. CN Marine, 1990 F.C.1 483 (1990). 
17
 Carling O’Keefe Breweries supra note 16 at 3.  
80 
 
and shippers.18 The charterer argued that it acted only as agent for the shipowner and 
accordingly signed the bill of lading in its capacity as agent for the shipowner.19 Further, the 
charterer argued that improper stowage of the goods occurred due to the shipowner’s 
negligence who was the “sole carrier”, as ensuring proper stowage was not in any way a duty 
to be performed by the charterer.20 Since the vessel concerned (Newfoundland Coast) was on 
time charter and the bill of lading included a demise clause, the charterer submitted that it 
could not be held as carrier of the cargo.21  
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal based on the following reasons:22 
The court referred to the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decisions in Paterson Steamships Ltd. V. 
Aluminum Co.23 and Aris Steamship Co. Inc. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corporation24 
and held that in these cases, the validity of the demise clause was upheld; which clause in a 
contract of carriage will lead to the contract “ordinarily” being one between the shipowner 
and shipper.25 However, this is not a “hard and fast rule”26 since the terms of relevant 
documents and the circumstances of each case will differ. This position is supported by Rand 
J’s dictum in Paterson Steamships Ltd. V. Aluminum Co,27 in which case the charterer was 
not found to be the carrier since the charterer did not undertake to act as carrier of the cargo.28 
The court held that a true construction of the bill encompasses examining all the terms and 
not only the demise clause (clause 18)29 contained in the bill.30 The court found the opening 
words of the demise clause “where the ship is not owned or chartered by demise to the ocean 
carrier by which the goods are intended to be carried hereunder,”31 to be of particular 
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importance. The court held that the terms “the ship” under this clause refer to the vessel that 
is to be named and identified on the face of the bill of lading.32 The purpose of this is that the 
time charterer would sign the bill of lading as agent for the owner of the vessel identified on 
the bill.33 However, the name of the carrying vessel was not included on the face of the bill 
and the portion on the bill for identifying the vessel was found blank.34 A few days had 
passed before the time charterer chose a vessel for the cargo to be loaded on and for such 
vessel to perform its voyage.35 The shipper was unaware that the carrying vessel was a 
chartered vessel rather than a vessel owned by the time charterer.36 Since the carrying vessel 
was not named in the bill of lading; the terms in the bill “as agent only,” describing the 
charterer as agent for the shipowner was rendered ineffective.37 This is because, when the bill 
was issued, the “only principal”38 contemplated insofar as the bill was concerned was the 
time charterer. Therefore the time charterer signed the bill in its personal capacity and 
accordingly became carrier of the cargo.39 
In addition, it was established that the bills of lading were signed “by or on behalf” of the 
time charterer’s terminal superintendent notwithstanding the time charterparty’s provision for 
the master or time charterer’s representative on board the vessel to sign the bills of lading.40 
The bills were signed in the following terms: 
“IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Agent has signed this bill of lading on behalf of the 
Canadian National Railway Company and its connecting railway and steamship lines, 
severally and not jointly.” 
“D. M. Mercer 
Terminal Super. 
Agent on behalf of the carriers severally and not jointly.” 
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s reasoning that: 
“The bill of lading was a [time charterer’s] bill…filled out and signed precisely in the 
same manner as if the cargo were going to be taken on a [time charterer’s] owned 
ship. No where was it indicated on the bill of lading that the [time charterer’s] 
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employee who signed it signed it on behalf of the master or the owners of the ship but 
only on behalf of [the time charterer].” 
The Federal Court of Appeal found the time charterer to be the carrier notwithstanding the 
inclusion of a demise clause in the contract of carriage.41 Having found the time charterer to 
be the carrier, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s finding on the invalidity of the 
demise clause which contravened Article 3(8) of the Hague-Visby Rules42 since it purported 
to relieve and lessen the time charterer’s duties43 under Article 3(2).44 
Additionally, the court rejected any notion of there being more than one contracting carrier 
under the Hague Rules.45 The court found the multicarrier approach to be “patently 
erroneous” since the Hague Rules provide for only one carrier to a contract of carriage.46 This 
finding has been critiqued by Professor Tetley who postulates that it is an “unnecessary 
finding”47 contrary to his theory of joint and several liability between shipowners and 
charterers. 
However, a few years later, the notion of a joint venture between shipowners and time 
charterers in the carriage of goods by sea was endorsed in the Lara S.48 In this case, the time 
charterer Kim-Sail entered into a time charter with shipowner Armadaores Lara S.A.49 The 
charterparty contained the standard clause found in a time charterparty under Clause 8 which 
stated that: 
“The Captain (although appointed by the Owners), shall be under the orders and 
directions of the Charterers as regards employment and agency; and Charterers are to 
load, stow and trim discharge and tally and, if necessary lash and secure the cargo at 
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their expense under the supervision of the Captain, who is to sign Bills of Lading for 
cargo as presented, in conformity with Mate’s or Tally Clerk’s receipts.”50 
 
Additionally, rider Clause 50 provided that: 
“Charterers Bill of Lading respectively Charter Party Bill of Lading [sic] to be used as 
required by Charterers…or their representatives have authority to sign…Bill of 
Lading for and on Master’s behalf in conformity with Mate’s and/or Tally Clerk’s 
receipts.”51 
 
In this case, cargo interests bought a cargo of bailer twine from the shipper.52 The cargo was 
loaded by stevedores hired by the time charterer on board the vessel Lara S in Brazil for its 
voyage to Toronto and Milwaukee.53 The master supervised the loading and stowage of the 
cargo on board the vessel.54 Bills of lading in respect of the consigned cargo were issued “to 
order of shipper, blank endorsed.”55 The bills of lading were on the time charterer’s form, and 
the top front of the bills contained in bold printed words “KIMBERLY LINE.”56 The bills 
were signed by Kimberly Line being a trade name utilized by the time charterer,57 as “Agent, 
For the Master.” by the port agent.58  The Master provided the port agent with written 
authority to sign bills of lading on his behalf.59 Upon the vessel’s arrival in Toronto, a portion 
of the cargo was found to be damaged, 60 and the cargo interests subsequently sued the time 
charterer and shipowner.61 
The time charterer argued that it was not liable for damage caused to the cargo since it was 
not a cargo carrier based on the identity of carrier clause contained in the bill.62 
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The Federal Court disregarded the identity of carrier clause,63 and agreed with Professor 
Tetley’s theory of a joint venture between shipowners and charterers ascribing to them joint 
and several liability as carriers.64  
Reed J held that: 
“The logic of holding both the shipowner and the charterer liable as carriers seems 
entirely reasonable under a charter such as that which exists in this case. The master 
will have knowledge of the vessel and any peculiarities which must be taken into 
account when stowing goods thereon. He supervises that stowage. He has 
responsibility for the conduct of the voyage and presumably also has knowledge of 
the type of weather conditions it would be usual to encounter. In such a case it seems 
entirely appropriate to find the master and therefore, his employer, the shipowner 
jointly liable with the charterer for damage arising out of inadequate stowage.”65 
 
The court found that under Canadian law, both the shipowner and the time charterer were 
carriers under the Hague Rules.66 Subsequently, both the shipowner and time charterer took 
the judgment on appeal where the Court of Appeal affirmed Madame Justice Reed’s 
judgment.67 
 
5.4.  A deviation from the traditional approach (An analysis of case law) 
While Canadian Courts were initially accepting of the notion of joint and several liability 
between charterers and shipowners in the carriage of goods by sea, such as in the case of the 
Lara S,68 this notion has not stood in law.69 Additionally, with the reasoning of the 
aforementioned cases, one would believe that Canadian maritime law viewed the demise 
clause and identity of carrier clause as invalid provisions void for its contravention of 
statutory law.70 However, more recent decisions have rejected the joint venture theory and 
have effectively resurrected the validity of the demise clause in support of the ‘agency 
approach’ i.e. the approach that there may be only one carrier.71 
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The case of Union Carbide Corp. v. Fednav Ltd,72 a decision rendered by Mr. Justice Marc 
Nadon, will be the first of these cases to be discussed. In this case, shipper Union Carbide 
shipped a cargo of synthetic resin on board the vessel Hudson Bay from Montreal to Bangkok 
and Manila.73 The cargo was carried as pursuant to bills of lading issued and dated at 
Montreal.74 Upon the vessel’s arrival at the port in Bangkok, a portion of the cargo 
discharged was found to be damaged.75 The vessel proceeded on its voyage to Manila and 
upon arrival at the Manila port, a further portion of cargo was found to be damaged.76 The 
cargo interests being the shipper and consignees of the cargo, brought action against Fednav 
Limited, a company formed by the merger of Federal Commerce and Federal Marine.77 The 
vessel was owned by Bona Maritime Corporation of Liberia and was time chartered to 
Federal Commerce under the NYPE time charterparty form.78 
Clause 8 of the charterparty provided for; 
“[the] charterers …to load, stow, trim and discharge the cargo at their expense under 
the supervision of the captain, who is to sign or if requested by charterers to authorise 
charterers and/or their agents to sign bills of lading for cargo as presented…”79 
 
Additionally, clause 26 provided for: 
“[t]he owners to remain responsible for the navigation of the vessel, acts of pilotage 
and tugboats, insurance, crew, and all other matters, same as when trading for their 
own account.”80 
 
The bills of lading were issued on the time charterer’s printed form,81 and the face of the bills 
at the top right-hand side contained the name Federal Commerce and Navigation Ltd. 
accompanied by its address in Montreal.82 The bills were signed by Federal Commerce on 
behalf of the master “by authority of master as agent only.”83 Additionally, the bills of lading 
contained a demise clause under Clause 2 providing that “the contract evidenced by the bill 
                                                            
72
 Union Carbide (1998) 131 F.T.R. 241, 1998 AMC 429 (Fed. C. Can.) 
73
 Union Carbide supra note 72 at 2. 
74
 Union Carbide supra note 72 at 2. 
75
 Union Carbide supra note 72 at 6. 
76
 Union Carbide supra note 72 at 6. 
77
 Union Carbide supra note 72 at 6. 
78
 Union Carbide supra note 72 at 4. 
79
 Union Carbide supra note 72 at 4. 
80
 Union Carbide supra note 72 at 4. 
81
 Union Carbide supra note 72 at 5. 
82
 Union Carbide supra note 72 at 5. 
83
 Union Carbide supra note 72 at 5. 
86 
 
of lading is one between the “merchant” and the owner of the vessel named in the bill of 
lading.”84 
One of the issues before the court to be discussed for the purposes of this discussion was who 
were “the parties to the contract of carriage.”85 Of importance to this issue, was whether 
Federal Commerce (the time charterer) was the carrier under the contract of carriage.86 
Federal Commerce argued that it was not party to the contracts of carriage since these were 
contracts that bound the shipowners.87 Contrastingly, the cargo interests submitted that the 
bills of lading were binding upon Federal Commerce, the time charterer.88  
In deciding this issue, Nadon J made reference to Paterson Steamships Limited v. Aluminium 
Company of Canada Limited89in which case the Supreme Court of Canada was confronted 
with the same issue as in the present case, namely “whether the shipowners or the time 
charterers were parties to the contract of carriage.”90 Rand J stated in regard to this issue that; 
“For the purpose of committing cargo to carriage, the captain, the charterer and the 
ship’s agent are all agents of the owner, acting in the name of the captain; and where 
the charterer has authority, as here, to sign for the captain, that he may appoint and act 
by an agent would seem to me to be unquestionable. To hold him to a personal 
performance would under modern conditions of traffic, be an intolerable 
restriction.”91 
 
The court in Paterson Steamships Limited v. Aluminium Company of Canada Limited92 stated 
that the shipowner is the carrier where the vessel is under time charter and in issuing bills of 
lading, the master of the vessel fulfils his role as the shipowner’s agent.93 The exception to 
this general principle is where the time charterer expressly undertakes to carry the goods, in 
that case then, the time charterer will be the carrier.94 This principle was subsequently 
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affirmed by the Supreme Court in Aris Steamship Co. v. Associates Metals and Minerals 
Corporation.95  
The court in the present case agreed entirely with this principle as one that was “settled” in 
law dating back to a line of English cases since 1893.96 Nadon J held, that in light of the 
above-mentioned judgements, Canadian Courts too have taken the position that in the case of 
the NYPE charterparty, the time charterer assumes the role of the shipowner’s agent under a 
bill of lading evidencing the contract of carriage.97 As such, in the absence of a specific and 
clear undertaking by the time charterer to carry the cargo, the shipowner will be the carrier.98 
In this case, the court found that the booking note issued by the time charterer contained no 
undertaking by Federal Commerce to carry the shipper’s cargo to Bangkok and Manila.99 
The court then turned to consider the demise clause contained in the bill of lading which 
provided that: 
“The contract evidenced by the bill of Lading was between the shipowner and cargo 
owner and therefore the shipowner shall be liable solely for any damage or loss 
resulting from non-performance or breach of the obligations in terms of the contract 
of carriage. The company or agent having issued the bill on the master’s behalf shall 
not be held as principal and should not be liable as carrier nor as bailee of the 
cargo”100 
 
Regarding the demise clause, Nadon J held that despite the existence of a demise clause 
under a time charter, where bills are signed on behalf of the master, the bills of lading 
evidencing the contracts of carriage bind the shipowner and not the time charterer, with the 
exception being that the time charterer expressly undertakes to carry the cargo.101 
Further, Nadon J held that while Federal Commerce was described as the carrier in the 
booking note contract, a “true construction” of the contract of carriage in its entirety clearly 
indicates the carrier to be the owner of the cargo carrying vessel.102 
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The cargo interests proceeded then to argue that the shipowners and the time charterer were 
both carriers under the contract of carriage.103 In support of this contention, cargo interests 
relied on Professor Tetley’s joint venture theory between shipowners and time charterers in 
the carriage of cargo;104 which also found approval by Reed J in The Lara S.105 
However, Nadon J rejected this argument refusing to accept the “soundness”106 of the 
theory.107 He held that a joint venture cannot exist between the shipowner and charterer 
except where there has been “a meeting of the minds between the parties.”108 By entering into 
a time charterparty on the NYPE standard form, the shipowner and charterer cannot be said to 
have agreed to form a joint venture to jointly carry the cargo.109 
Additionally, in dealing with Article 1(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules which defines the 
“carrier” as including “the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a 
shipper;” Nadon J held that where the contract of carriage binds the charterer, the shipowner 
shall not be bound.110 If the charterer issues and signs the bill of lading on his own behalf, he 
will be liable on the bill. But where the charterer does so on behalf of the master having been 
authorized by the master, the shipowner remains liable on the bill.111 The term “or” contained 
in Article 1(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules contemplates only one carrier, either the shipowner 
or the charterer.112 The court concluded that the shipowner was party to the contract of 
carriage and therefore the contractual carrier.113 
In Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A,114 the Federal Court had to determine the validity of 
an identity of carrier clause within its frame of reference to the enforceability of a jurisdiction 
clause in the bill of lading which stated that “disputes under the contract of carriage were to 
be decided in the country where the “carrier” had its principal place of business.”115 In this 
case, the shipper hired space on the vessel M.V. “TRANS ASPIRATION” for the carriage of 
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lumber from Nanaimo, Canada to the plaintiff Jian Sheng in Taichung, Taiwan.116 The vessel 
was owned by Great Tempo S.A, a Panamanian company, however the company’s business 
was managed and run from Hong Kong by Wah Tung Shipping Agency Co.117 The vessel 
was on time charter to Sinotrans (Bermuda) Ltd.118 The carriage was booked with a booking 
note issued by defendant Sinotrans (Canada) Inc based in British Columbia, Canada.119 
However, the bill of lading covering the cargo was issued in Vancouver by Sinotrans 
(Bermuda) Ltd with Jian Sheng as the party to notify.120 The bill of lading stated the master’s 
name;121 and Sinotrans (Canada) Inc signed the bills “AS AGENTS ONLY FOR CARRIER: 
TRANS ASPIRATION.”122 During the voyage, some pieces of lumber carried on the deck 
were lost,123 and Jian Sheng sued the shipowner, the charterer, and all interested parties on 
the vessel for loss of the goods.124 
One of the provisions at issue before the Federal Court, Trial Division, was the identity of 
carrier clause inserted in the bill of lading, which provided that the contract of carriage was 
between the Merchant (cargo interest) and the shipowner.125 
Tremblay-Lamer J in the Trial Division made mention of Prothonotary Hargrave’s comment 
in the lower court where Prothonotary Hargrave held that the time charterer Sinotrans 
(Bermuda) Ltd may be a carrier126 agreeing with Professor Tetley’s theory of joint and 
several liability between the shipowner and charterer as carriers despite the inclusion of any 
identity of carrier clause.127 The Trial Division,  however dismissed this theory as being a 
“general statement.”128 The Court held that unless the charterer makes an express undertaking 
to carry the goods, the shipowner and charterer cannot be jointly and severally liable as 
carriers.129 In line with this reasoning, the court upheld the identity of carrier clause and 
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found the shipowner to be the carrier under the bill of lading.130 It was held; on the face of the 
bill, neither Sinotrans (Bermuda) Ltd nor Sinotrans (Canada) could be held as a carrier.131 
On appeal, the issue before Mr. Justice Decary was based on the jurisdiction clause being 
void for uncertainty.132 Within the context of this issue, the Federal Court of Appeal too had 
to determine the validity of the identity of carrier clause contained in the bill of lading.133 In 
relation to this, the court held that the clause clearly demonstrates that the bill intends to 
evidence a contract of carriage between the shipowner and cargo owner, and that as against a 
third-party consignee, the bill of lading is a shipowner’s bill .134  
Decary J.A held: 
“I am not convinced that, as against a consignee, the fact of using the words “agents 
for the ship” rather than the words “agents for the shipowner” is enough to displace 
the presumption [that the shipowner is the carrier].”135 
 
As such, the court effectively upheld the identity of carrier clause.136 
In relation to the notion that there may be more than one carrier to a contract of carriage, the 
Court of Appeal agreeing with Tremblay-Lamer J, found the joint venture theory to be 
“incompatible” with the judgements of the Supreme Court in previous decisions .137 The 
court reasoned that the role of the carrier would be fulfilled by a joint venture or partnership 
where the shipowner and charterer actually agree to form and carry out such joint venture or 
partnership in the carriage of goods.138  In stating this, the court alluded to a joint venture as 
one legal entity being liable as the carrier.139 Decary J.A relied extensively on Nadon J’s 
reasoning in Union Carbide140 and held that Professor Tetley’s notion of a joint venture 
                                                            
130
 Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A supra [1997] note 116 at 8. 
131
 Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A supra [1997] note 116 at 8. 
132
 Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A supra [1998] note 114 at 1 para 2.  
133
 Tetley (note 12 above; 629). 
134
 Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A supra [1998] note 114 at 14-15 para 35. 
135
 Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A supra [1998] note 114 at 14-15 para 35. 
136
 Tetley (note 12 above; 630). 
137
 See Paterson Steamships Ltd. v. Aluminum Co. of Canada Ltd [1951] S.C.R. 852;  Aris Steamship Co. Inc. v. 
Associated Metals & Minerals Corporation [1980] 2 S.C.R. 322; Canficorp v. Cormorant Bulk Carriers, 1985 
A.M.C. 1444 (1985); Carling O’Keefe Breweries v. CN Marine, 1990 F.C.1 483 (1990). 
138
 Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A supra [1998] note 114 at 7-8 para 19. 
139
 Tetley (note 12 above; 630). 
140
 Union Carbide supra note 72 above.  
91 
 
between shipowner and charterer does not apply to Canadian maritime law.141  The assertion 
that there may be more than one carrier was effectively dismissed.142 
 
5.5.  Criticisms surrounding the current approach taken by Canadian courts on the 
validity and effectiveness of the demise clause and identity of carrier clause 
The judgements rendered by the Federal Court of Appeal in Union Carbide Corp. v. Fednav 
Ltd,143 and Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A,144 in dismissing the notion of joint and 
several liability between shipowners and charterers and, in upholding the validity of the 
demise clause and identity of carrier clause has been criticized by Professor Tetley as 
“directly contravening the spirit and letter of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, the 
Hamburg Rules and general principles of law.”145 Particularly, Professor Tetley asserts that 
Nadon J’s judgment lacked consideration of Article 3(8) of the Hague-Visby Rules.146 He 
asserts that the judgement also failed to consider the mandatory nature of the Rules applying 
to a party acting as a carrier.147 These considerations significantly attributed to the decision of 
Reed J148 in The Lara S.149 Tetley strongly suggests that the relationship between a shipowner 
and time charterer constitutes a joint venture150 making them both the carrier.151 The demise 
clause allows a party to escape liability by portraying a party to be an agent of the shipowner 
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under a bill of lading instead of a carrier.152 The demise clause unjustly excludes certain 
parties from carrier liability.153 
Marler also criticises the decision in Union Carbide154 based on Nadon J’s finding that; in the 
absence of an express undertaking by the time charterer to carry the cargo, the time charterer 
cannot be held as the carrier.155 He submits that this finding takes beyond a warranted extent 
the trueness of the contractual relationship between the shipper and the cargo carrier.156 It is a 
principle that contravenes the general principles of contract law.157 He asserts emphatically 
that the charterer does not assume the role of the shipowner’s agent in procuring the shipper’s 
cargo.158 This is supported by the fact that the time charterer collects the freight from third 
parties in its own name, and not on behalf of the shipowner as his agent.159 Marler submits 
that the charterer acts as agent for the shipowner only with respect to issuing and signing bills 
on behalf of the master and thereby on behalf of the shipowner binding the shipowner to the 
contract of carriage.160 However; this does not refute the charterer’s role as principal to the 
contract of carriage between itself and the shipper.161 As such, a charterer having entered into 
a contract of carriage with a shipper may not contract out of its liability under the contract in 
terms of the Hague-Visby Rules.162  
Moreover, since time charterers undertake most of the financial and operational 
responsibilities of a carrier, including the issuance of bills of lading, as well as the loading, 
discharge and delivery of cargo carried, it is asserted that the fulfilment of these duties give 
rise to an implied undertaking by the charterer to carry the goods.163 
However, despite the contentions of disapproval by many scholars of the judgements 
rendered in Union Carbide164 and Jian Sheng,165 the decision by Nadon J in Union Carbide 
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found approval by the court in Voest-Alpine Stahl Linz GmbH v. Federal Pacific Ltd,166 and 
its principles were applied accordingly. This case dealt with the burden of proof with respect 
to cargo claims and whether or not the goods had been damaged during the voyage.167 The 
issues of who had performed the carriage and whether the time charterer and shipowner were 
jointly liable as cargo carrier were also in dispute.168 In this case,169 the Hague-Visby Rules 
applied to the contract of carriage.170 
The cargo interests submitted that the shipowner and the time charterer undertook a joint 
venture in carrying the goods and were thus jointly liable as the carrier.171 In respect of this 
submission, Mr Justice Blais referred to Nadon J’s comment in Union Carbide,172 in which 
he rejected the joint venture theory disagreeing with the statement that once a time charter is 
entered into on the NYPE standard form, a joint venture is created between the shipowner 
and time charterer to carry the goods.173 The Federal Court agreeing with Nadon J’s 
statement held that the joint venture theory may only apply where the “documents”174 and the 
“circumstances”175 of the case clearly indicate a specific undertaking of a joint venture.176 
The court found, based on the documents and specifically the bill of lading; as well as the 
circumstances of the case, that no such undertaking was made.177 
Additionally, the court held that the customary role of the time charterer is to secure space on 
a vessel, and having booked that space, he obtains the cargo asking the carrier or owner of the 
vessel to carry such cargo.178 Subsequently, the carrier issues a bill of lading thereby forming 
a contract of carriage between itself and the shipper.179 As such, the court concluded that the 
shipowner was the carrier under the contract of carriage180 
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The combined effect of the decisions in Union Carbide,181 Jian Sheng182 and Voest Alpine183 
have effectuated the validation of the demise clause in identifying the carrier under Canadian 
maritime law.184 As such, under Canadian Maritime law, the issue of who is the carrier under 
a bill of lading will be determined by following the principles as set out in Union Carbide185 
and Jian Sheng186 until the Supreme Court of Canada makes a finding of finality on the 
matter or until the Hamburg Rules is enacted.187 
 
5.6.  Conclusion  
This chapter first set out the traditional approach taken by Canadian Courts on the validity of 
the demise clause under bills of lading in cases such as Canadian Klockner v. D/S A/S Flint 
(The Mica)188 and Carling O’Keefe Breweries v. C.N. Marine.189 The original position taken 
by Canadian Courts ascribed invalidity to the demise clause for its contravention of 
international law regimes. In this way Canadian maritime law differed from American law 
with respect to the development on the role of the demise clause in identifying the carrier 
under bills of lading. The notion of a joint venture between time charterers and shipowners, 
and the multicarrier approach was also met with disapproval in early Canadian judgments.  
It was only a few years later in the Lara S190 that courts accepted the concept of a joint 
venture ascribing to shipowners and charterers joint and several liability as carriers. However, 
acceptance of the joint venture theory did not maintain its status in Canadian Courts.  The 
court in Union Carbide Corp. v. Fednav Ltd191 rejected the notion of joint and several 
liability between shipowners and charterers finding the concept to be unsound. The court held 
fast to the single carrier approach making provision for either the shipowner or the charterer 
to be carrier but not both.  Significantly, a later decision of the Federal Court192 relying 
extensively on the judgment in Union Carbide Corp. v. Fednav Ltd193 ascribed validity to the 
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demise clause in support of the approach that there may be only one carrier to a contract of 
carriage.  
The current position of the courts has been criticised by scholars as opposing the spirit and 
letter of international conventions regulating sea carriage as well as the principles of contract 
law. However, the identity of carrier question in Canadian law continues to be determined 
according to the principles set forth in these cases.  
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Chapter Six: A South African Perspective – A look at contractual interpretation and the 
effects of identifying the carrier under bills of lading when enforcing the action in rem 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
This chapter will deal primarily with the processes and approaches taken to contractual 
interpretation. The chapter will first discuss the objective approach/contextual approach to 
contractual interpretation adopted in the United Kingdom and will analyse certain challenges 
surrounding the contextual approach such as third-party reliance on contractual documents as 
was found in The Starsin.1 The chapter will also examine two mechanisms suggested in 
expanding the contextual approach to account for third party reliance on contractual 
documents. The chapter seeks also to examine the important role of commercial common 
sense in the process of contractual interpretation and, the need to ensure that this factor does 
not override the language of the contractual document. Additionally, the chapter will discuss 
the judicial shift undertaken in South African Courts from a literal approach to a contextual 
approach of interpretation. South African courts now follow the iterative/unitary interpretive 
approach as set forth in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality.2 
Finally, in light of the previous chapters, it is clear that judicial decisions dealing with the 
validity and effect of the demise clause have differed vastly through a number of cases; it is 
therefore necessary to ascertain the influence of these decisions on a South African Court 
exercising its admiralty jurisdiction. As such, the chapter will ultimately analyse the question 
of who is the carrier under a bill of lading containing a demise clause by applying the current 
judicial position taken by the English courts, American courts and Canadian courts in the 
context of a claimant seeking to enforce a maritime claim by way of the South African action 
in rem.  
 
6.2.  Contractual interpretation in the United Kingdom  
English courts adopt an objective approach to the interpretation of contractual documents.3 
The famously cited judgement by Lord Hoffman in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v 
                                                            
1
 Homburg Houtimport BV v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin), 2003 U.K.H.L. 12, 2004 A.C.1 715 (2003); [2004] 
AC 59 at 588 para [73]. 
2
 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA). 
3
 K Gibbons, S James & M Newick ‘The strange death of literal England’ (2010) 4(1) Law and Financial Markets 
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West Bromwich Building Society4 sets out the interpretive process of contracts undertaken by 
English Courts.5 This objective approach which is also known as the contextual approach, 
affords primacy to the principle of good faith and places commercial practices and reasonable 
expectations as decisive factors when interpreting contractual documents.6 This approach 
directs the courts to view a contractual document as a reasonable person who possesses the 
relevant background information would.7 The words used in the contract, with their 
dictionary and grammatical meanings play a key role to this objective consideration.8 
Importantly, in every case, regard must be given to the relevant context in which the 
contractual provisions are used - not as an attempt to alter the meaning of the words;  but 
rather to ascertain the meaning of the words.9 
 
                                                            
4
 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896. 
5
 Gibbons et al (note 3 above; 36); see also Investors Compensation Service Ltd v West Bromwich Building 
Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912-913 as per Lord Hoffman: 
‘(1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a 
reasonable person having all the knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the 
parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract. 
(2) The background was famously referred to… as the ‘matrix of fact,’ but this phrase is, if anything, an 
understated description of what the background may include. 
Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties and to the 
exception to be mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in 
which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man. 
(3) The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the parties and 
their declarations of subjective intent.. . .The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical 
policy... 
(4) The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man is not 
the same thing as the meaning of words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and 
grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant 
background would reasonably have been understood to mean. The background may not merely 
enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible meanings of words which are ambiguous 
but even (as occasionally happens in ordinary life) to conclude that the parties must, for whatever 
reason, have used the wrong words or syntax. 
(5) The 'rule' that words should be given their 'natural and ordinary meaning' reflects the common 
sense proposition that we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, particularly 
in formal documents. On the other hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background 
that something must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to attribute 
to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had . . . “if detailed semantic and 
syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts 
business common sense, it must be made to yield to business common sense”.’ 
6
 Z X Tan ‘Beyond the Real and the Paper Deal: The Quest for Contextual Coherence in Contractual 
Interpretation’ (2016) 79(4) The Modern Law Review 623 at 624. 
7
 M Wallis ‘What’s in a word? Interpretation through the Eyes of Ordinary Readers’ (2010) 127(4) South African 
Law Journal 673 at 691. 
8
 Wallis (note 7 above; 691).   
9
 Wallis (note 7 above; 691).   
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6.2.1.  The effects on third parties in contractual interpretation 
Whilst contextualism is the present approach to interpreting contracts, problems such as 
reliance by a third party10 has occurred in cases such as The Starsin.11 The approach adopted 
in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society12 is problematic in 
instances of third parties relying on the apparent meaning of a contract, without having 
knowledge of the background information which is known to the contractual parties and 
which may be used in order to ascertain the meaning of the contract.13 For example, a third 
party assignee relying on the apparent meaning of a contract later finding out that this 
meaning has been changed by information that he was unaware of and which may not have 
been available to him; is placed in an unfavourable position by use of that information.14 
However, Lord Hoffman has suggested that the contextual approach is able to account for 
third party reliance on contracts.15 Scholars have recognized that there are two ways in which 
this may be done.16 The first approach is to “limit the knowledge available to the reasonable 
man in ascertaining the meaning of the document.”17 This means that the reasonable person 
would have knowledge only of information “which is shared by the parties and those third 
parties likely to be affected.”18 The reasonable person would not have access to “all the 
knowledge reasonably available to the parties.”19  
The alternative approach involves acknowledging the prospect of a third-party reliance on the 
contract, which the reasonable person must consider as a factor when interpreting the 
document.20 Therefore, the prospect of a third-party reliance may have a bearing on the 
meaning of the document as read by the reasonable person.21 
This approach was adopted by Lord Hoffman22 in The Starsin.23 The principle in Investors 
Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society24 recognizes that contracts are 
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77(4) The Modern Law Review 597 at 598. 
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addressed to the contractual parties, however that principle was extended by Lord Hoffman in 
The Starsin25  to incorporate the effect on third parties, for in some instances the contract may 
also be addressed to third parties.26 Lord Hoffman noted that the bill of lading evidences the 
contract of carriage and also constitutes a document of title that may be transferred to third 
parties or may act as security.27 The reasonable reader of the bill will know that such a bill is 
addressed not only to the contractual parties but to “a potentially wide class of third 
parties.”28 It was held that: 
“The interpretation of a legal document involves ascertaining what meaning it would 
convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which is 
reasonably available to the person or class of persons to whom the document is 
addressed. A written contract is addressed to the parties; a public document like a 
statute is addressed to the public at large; a patent specification is addressed to 
persons skilled in the relevant art, and so on.”29 
 
In this way, Lord Hoffman broadened the interpretive process by stating that the bill of lading 
should be viewed as being addressed to the contractual parties as well as to bankers.30 
However, some scholars assert that this approach of excluding the reasonable reader from 
knowledge, which would be available to contractual parties is contrary to the principle of 
interpretation31 set forth in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building 
Society.32 This is because the contextual approach accounts for all background information 
except for prior negotiations to be included for the reasonable person’s ascertainment of the 
meaning of the contract.33 Barber finds the suggestion in The Starsin to be “clumsy”34 as it 
seeks the “absolute removal of material that would otherwise be relevant”35 to the interpretive 
process. 36 
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 The Starsin supra [2003] note 1 above.  
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 The Starsin supra [2003] note 1 at 588 para 74. 
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6.3.  The role of ‘commercial common sense’ in contractual interpretation 
The notion of “commercial common sense”37 plays a significant role when contextually 
interpreting a contract. Commercial common sense forms part of the contractual 
interpretation criterion to be used by the reasonable person when ascertaining the meaning of 
a document.38  Lord Neuberger in Arnold v Britton39 held that common sense is a factor to be 
applied when interpreting a contractual document.40 
Commercial common sense entails a judge taking into account in the interpretive process 
how a document would be read by those in business “positioned in the relevant market or 
commercial context.”41 In The Starsin,42 Lord Bingham commented that “business sense is 
that which businessmen, in the course of their ordinary dealings, would give the document.”43 
Additionally, in The Seaflower (2001), Sir Jonathan Parker L.J held that commercial common 
sense is to refrain from “subjecting [a] clause to a process of minute textual examination and 
analysis.”44 The court held that it entails an enquiry into the “commercial aims and 
objectives”45 as directed in the contract rather than delving into the words alone.46 
In light of the above, courts have found it inappropriate to subject commercial documents 
such as bills of lading to semantic analysis since, 
“to seek perfect consistency and economy of draftsmanship in a complex form of 
contract which has evolved over many years is to pursue a chimera… If an obviously 
inappropriate form is used, its language must be adapted to apply to the particular 
case.”47  
As was noted by Lord Grabiner, “It is critically important that the commercial purpose of the 
transaction is derived from the contract as a whole and from an accurate understanding of the 
way in which the various provisions interact”48 Therefore, judges ought to construe the whole 
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 N Andrews ‘Interpretation of Contracts and “Commercial Common Sense”: Do Not Overplay This Useful 
Criterion’ (2017) 76(1) The Cambridge Law Journal 36 at 1. 
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 BS&N Ltd (BVI) v Micado Shipping Ltd (Malta) (“The Seaflower”) [2001] C.L.C. 421 at [82] as per per Jonathan 
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document in its factual matrix, “giving effect to the contract as intended”49 in keeping with 
the “reasonable expectations of businessmen.”50 
So essential is the concept of commercial common sense to contractual interpretation that 
Lord Diplock in The Antaios51 held that: “If detailed and syntactical analysis of words in a 
commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business common sense it 
must yield to business common sense.”52 Additionally Christopher Clarke L.J  in Wood v 
Sureterin Direct Ltd & Capita Insurance Services Ltd (2015) noted that: 
“The more unbusinesslike or unreasonable the result of any given interpretation the 
more the court may favour a possible interpretation which does not produce such a 
result and the clearer the words must be to lead to that result. Thus if what is prima 
facie the natural reading produces a wholly unbusinesslike result, the court may 
favour another, even if less obvious, reading…”53 
 
However, it is imperative that we do not view commercial common sense as a criterion which 
overrides the significance of the language of the contract.54 A court may not rewrite55 the 
contractual language if the terms appear to be commercially unwise or unreasonable to some 
extent.56 Courts must guard against “[substituting] for the bargain actually made one which 
the court believes could better have been made.”57 The case of Rainy Sky58 sets forth clearly 
that the judiciary will not undertake a “broad, purposive approach to questions of 
construction, which allows them, in effect, to rewrite contracts by reference to their own 
notions of commerciality.”59 Wallis notes that the risk of rewriting or replacing words is that 
judges subvert the parties’ intended contract or force upon the parties a contract different 
from the one they entered into.60 Courts are not responsible for creating agreements for 
parties; parties create their own bargains and respect for party autonomy dictates that courts 
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 Rainy Sky SA and Others v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 [2012] Lloyds Rep 34 (SC). 
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must give regard to that bargain, subject to public policy imbued by the Constitution.61 This 
principle has been settled in South African case law in Barkhuizen v Napier:62 
‘On the one hand public policy, as informed by the Constitution, requires in general that 
parties should comply with contractual obligations that have been freely and voluntarily 
undertaken. This consideration is expressed in the maxim pacta sunt servanda, which, as 
the Supreme Court of Appeal has repeatedly noted, gives effect to the central 
constitutional values of freedom and dignity. Self-autonomy, or the ability to regulate 
one’s own affairs, even to one’s own detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a vital 
part of dignity. The extent to which the contract was freely and voluntarily concluded is 
clearly a vital factor as it will determine the weight that should be afforded to the values 
of freedom and dignity.’63 
 
6.4.  The development of contractual interpretation in South Africa 
South African law has also made a judicial shift from literalism to contextualism in the 
interpretation of contracts and statutes.64 The contextual approach adopted by South African 
Courts view ‘context’ as including “the rest of the contract, background and surrounding 
circumstances to the transaction, as well as of course the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights.”65 Both English Courts and South African Courts have recognized commercial 
practices, trade customs and norms to play a vital role in the judicial interpretation of 
contracts.66 
English contract law has been influential on the interpretative process followed in South 
African Courts due to England’s abundance of commercial activity, the commercial contract 
adjudication in English Courts, the reputation of English contract law as to certainty, and the 
extensive use of English law in governing international contracts.67 
Traditionally, the approach to contractual interpretation under South African law involved 
ascertaining “the external manifestation of the minds of the parties rather than their subjective 
intentions.”68 This process constituted an objective enquiry into the common intention of the 
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parties based on the words used by the parties in their contract.69  However, this approach 
indicated that the interpretive process involved an examination into the minds of the 
contracting parties.70 Therefore, the examination was limited to establishing “the meaning of 
the words and language itself.”71 Additionally, a determination of the “intention of the 
parties” despite its use by lawyers; poses difficulty since the contractual aims of the parties 
are “filtered”72 through the language and words of lawyers in contractual negotiations who 
seek to fulfil client instructions stemming from financial advisers.73 Even more difficult is 
seeking the intention of the parties from contractual agreements that are “embodied in 
standard form agreement and imposed as the terms on which the more powerful contracting 
party will conclude an agreement.”74 Wallis JA noted that a search for the intention of the 
parties restricts the enquiry to the “ordinary grammatical meaning” of the words used.75  
Wallis JA found that: 
 “If interpretation is… an exercise in ascertaining the meaning of the words used… 
and is objective in form, it is unrelated to whatever intention those responsible for the 
words may have had at the time they selected them.”76 
 
Rather, seeking the intention of the parties must act solely as a guard restricting judges to the 
ascertainment of the words used by the contracting parties,77 and restraining them from 
venturing into making the contract “more effective”78 or to better the contract entered into by 
the parties.79  
The judgement in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality80 set forth in 
clear terms the new interpretive process of written documents in South African law known as 
the ‘unitary’ or ‘iterative’81 approach.82 The Supreme Court of Appeal shifted away from 
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104 
 
looking at the ‘ordinary grammatical meaning’83 of the words and the intention of the parties 
when interpreting legal documents and statutes.84 However, the judicial shift in interpretation 
is not a completely new notion in South African Courts.85 In earlier times the courts have 
moved away from the literal interpretive approach for its inappropriateness,86 but hesitated 
from moving away completely from literalism and formalism despite the “internal tensions”87 
of the process.88   
The court held that the “proper approach”89 to interpretation is “to read the words used in the 
context of the document as a whole and in light of all relevant circumstances.”90  The court 
held this to be the manner in which people use and understand words; this approach being 
“sensible”91 and “transparent.”92 It makes clearer the interpretive process when adopted by 
the courts.93 The court noted the unprofitability of attempts to determine the meaning of a 
word which can have more than one meaning without having regard to the context in which 
the word is used.94 As such, the new approach to interpretation gives language and grammar 
equal footing as background and context,95 “neither predominating over the other.”96  
The new approach to the interpretative process was encapsulated in the following terms: 
1. The interpretation exercise follows an objective process and not a subjective one.97 
2. The starting point is to look at the language of the contractual document,98 however 
not with a view to seek the subjective intentions and motives of the contractual 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494 (SCA) paras 10–12; Novartis SA (Pty) Ltd v Maphil Trading (Pty) Ltd 2016 (1) SA 518 (SCA) 
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The Electoral Commission 2006 (3) SA 305 (CC) paras 20–5; Department of Land Affairs & others v Goedgelegen 
Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC) paras 51–5. 
83
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parties,99 but rather to be considered against the contextual knowledge and 
background of the document.100  
3.  The meaning of words used in statutes and contracts is to be interpreted with 
consideration to the context in which the words have been used, viewing the 
document as a whole and with regard to the relevant circumstances.101 
4. The meaning of the words is to be determined having regard to the language adopted 
by the parties in terms of the “ordinary rules of grammar and syntax.”102 
5. “The apparent purpose” for which the language has been assigned and determined in 
use, and the information known to the relevant parties upon its coming into existence 
must be considered.103 
Much like the approach adopted in English contract law,104 Wallis JA noted that, where a 
word bears more than one possible meaning in terms of the language used, the “apparent 
purpose of the provision” and the use of the word in its proper context play important roles in 
rightly interpreting the document.105 Importantly, it was held that: 
“An interpretation will not be given that leads to impractical, unbusinesslike or 
oppressive consequences or that will stultify the broader operation of the legislation or 
contract under consideration.”106 
 
In keeping with the values of the current unitary approach to interpretation, it is likely that 
South African Courts will take a “businesslike” or commercially practicable view to the 
interpretation of bills of lading, particularly in the ascertainment of contractual provisions 
relating to the identity of carrier. South African Courts have not been confronted with the 
issue of determining the contractual carrier under a bill of lading containing a demise clause 
or identity of carrier clause; however; in light of the contractual interpretation adopted by 
South African Courts, it is likely that our courts will follow the judicial reasoning of English 
Courts on this matter. The case of The Starsin,107 which decision is the current position 
adopted by English Courts in determining the carrier under a bill of lading indicates that it 
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makes business sense108 that the written provisions on the face of the bill identifying the 
parties to convey to the reasonable person who the contractual carrier is.109 Should South 
African Courts be faced with the same issue, it is likely that the meaning of the bill of lading 
will be ascertained in a similar manner.  
 
6.5.  The effects of identifying the carrier under a bill of lading for a claimant seeking 
to enforce a maritime claim by way of the Action in rem  
South African law provides for all matters relating to maritime to be brought before a South 
African Court exercising its admiralty jurisdiction.110 The South African Admiralty Court is 
regulated by the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983,111 as amended.112 
The action in rem is a form of procedure that “is instituted by the arrest within the area of the 
court’s jurisdiction of property in respect of which the maritime claim lies.”113 Where a cargo 
interest seeks to institute a maritime claim by way of an action in rem, the maritime claim 
may be enforced according to section 3(4) of AJRA.  
Section 3(4) of the Act provides that: 
“Without prejudice to any other remedy that may be available to a claimant or to the 
rules relating to the joinder of causes of action, a maritime claim may be enforced by 
an action in rem, (a) if the claimant has a maritime lien over the property to be 
arrested, or (b) if the owner of the property to be arrested would be liable to the 
claimant in an action in personam in respect of the cause of action concerned.”114  
 
This means that where a maritime lien does not exist over the property to be arrested (here 
ownership of the vessel is immaterial), the claimant must establish that the shipowner would 
be personally liable to the claimant in respect of the claim,115 i.e. that the shipowner would be 
liable to the claimant in an action in personam in respect of the maritime claim.116 Important 
to note is section 1(3) of the Act which provides that “[f]or the purposes of an action in rem, a 
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demise charterer is deemed to be the owner of the ship for the period of the demise 
charter.”117 As such, an action in rem may be validly instituted against a demise charterer 
who is personally liable to the claimant based on the maritime claim. Additionally, section 
3(4) of the Act requires the shipowner to be personally liable to the claimant when the action 
is instituted and at the time of the vessel’s arrest.118 In order to satisfy this requirement, the 
defendant to the cargo claim must be the owner of the ship to be arrested.119  
The conflicting judgements handed down by the various courts in the United Kingdom, the 
United States of America as well as in Canada as discussed in previous chapters, present 
great difficulty in establishing the correct defendant to a cargo claim, i.e. whether the carrier 
of the cargo is the shipowner or time charterer.  
In The Starsin,120 which decision is the current position adopted by English courts in 
determining the carrier under a bill of lading, it was held that, it makes business sense121 for 
the contractual carrier to be determined by looking at the provisions on the face of the bill 
(written and typed), paying particular attention to the signature box and not by viewing the 
pre-printed clauses on the back of the bill (clauses which are usually inconsistent with the 
provisions on the front of the bill).122 Therefore, where the provisions on the front of the bill 
including the signature box provide for the time charterer to be the carrier, the demise clause 
on the back of the bill stating the shipowner to be the carrier will be rendered ineffective.  
As such, if the English position for determining the contractual carrier had to be adopted in 
South African Courts, a demise clause contained in a bill of lading which is inconsistent with 
the provisions on the face of the bill will be ineffective in identifying the carrier. In a case 
where a time charterer is found to be the contractual carrier, a cargo interest may not enforce 
a claim for loss of or damage to goods by way of an action in rem. Whilst a claimant may 
have a valid maritime claim in terms of section 1(1)(g) of AJRA123 for the loss of or damage 
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to goods, it is not permissible for the claimant to institute an action in rem against the 
shipowner in terms of section 3(4)(b) of the Act. This is because the shipowner or demise 
charterer of the vessel is not personally liable on the maritime claim,124 i.e. he is not liable as 
the cargo carrier under the bill of lading.  
The action in rem may only be pursued then if the claimant has a maritime lien over the 
vessel.125 The holder of a maritime lien can bring an action in rem against the shipowner even 
in the absence of personal liability on the part of the shipowner in respect of the claim.126 
However, a claim for loss of or damage to cargo on board a vessel is not a claim giving rise 
to a maritime lien in South Africa. South African law recognizes only the six maritime liens 
of English law, that being, the salvage lien, the seaman’s wages lien, the bottomry lien, 
master’s wages, master’s disbursements, and collision damage.127 Therefore, a cargo interest 
may not successfully pursue the action in rem in terms of section 3(4)(a) either.  In such 
instances an action in personam must be instituted in terms of section 3(2),128 and since it is 
unlikely that the debtor would be domiciled or carrying on business in South Africa, an 
application for the attachment of property (such as bunkers) belonging to the time charterer 
must be made to found or confirm the jurisdiction of the South African Court.   
To complicate matters further, should South African Courts follow the current position 
adopted by U.S courts in determining the carrier using the multicarrier approach; the result 
may be that a cargo interest would not be permitted to institute an action in rem against a 
shipowner in respect of a claim for loss of or damage to cargo.129 This is because the 
multicarrier approach provides that there may be more than one contractual carrier, and that a 
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carrier may be a party other than the shipowner or charterer having issued the bill of 
lading.130 This approach is in direct conflict with the enforcing requirement for the action in 
rem
131
 since the owner or demise charterer of the vessel may not be personally liable as 
carrier to the claimant in respect of the cargo lost or damaged.132 Instead, the contractual 
carrier will include all parties involved in the carriage of goods,133 even a party who has not 
issued and signed the bill of lading.134 Therefore, a claimant seeking to enforce a maritime 
claim by way of an action in rem in a South African Court may find great difficulty in 
establishing the correct defendant to a cargo claim. 
Alternatively, where the shipowner or demise charterer is the first defendant, and the time 
charterer is a second defendant liable jointly or in the alternative, it may be possible to utilise 
the joinder provisions in section 5(1) of AJRA135 to include the time charterer as a second 
defendant to an action instituted both in rem and in personam.136 Section 5(1) allows for the 
                                                            
130
 M T Reilly ‘Identity of the Carrier: Issues Under Slot Charters’ (2001) 505(25) Tulane Maritime Law Journal 
509. 
131
 Section 3(4)(b) of AJRA states:  
(4) Without prejudice to any other remedy that may be available to a claimant or to the rules relating     
to the joinder of causes of action a maritime claim may be enforced by an action in rem – 
(b) if the owner of the property to be arrested would be liable to the claimant in an action in 
personam in respect of the cause of action concerned. 
132
 Section 3(4) of AJRA. 
133
 T J Schoenbaum Admiralty and Maritime Law 4 ed (2004) 688-689. 
134
 Reilly M T (note 130 above; 509).  
135
 Section 5(1) of AJRA states: 
5 (1) A court may in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction permit the joinder in proceedings in 
terms of this Act of any person against whom any party to those proceedings has a claim, whether 
jointly with, or separately from, any party to those proceedings, or from whom any party to those 
proceedings is entitled to claim a contribution or an indemnification, or in respect of whom any 
question or issue in the action is substantially the same as a question or issue which has arisen or will 
arise between the party and the person to be joined and which should be determined in such a 
manner as to bind that person, whether or not the claim against the latter is a maritime claim and 
notwithstanding the fact that he is not otherwise amenable to the jurisdiction of the court, whether 
by reason of the absence of attachment of his property or otherwise. 
136
 See The Dictator [1892] P 304 ([1891 – 4] All ER Rep 360) in which case the procedural theory arose as one 
of two propositions, that being that once a shipowner enters an appearance to defend, if such owner is 
personally liable under the claim, in terms of the forms of procedure applicable within English courts exercising 
admiralty jurisdiction, such person has submitted to the court’s jurisdiction and is expressly cited; the claim 
then proceeds as both an action in rem and action in personam. Any judgment will be enforceable as a 
judgement in personam against him. 
In response to this proposition it was held by Wallis JA in MV Alina II 2011 (6) SA 206 (SCA) at para 30 that this 
is not the case in terms of South African admiralty proceedings. The SCA stated that: 
“[I]n terms of admiralty rule 2(4), read with form 1 to the admiralty rules, the summons in rem is not 
addressed to and does not cite the owner or other persons having an interest in the vessel or other 
[property] arrested in order to commence the action.  To make sure that judgment lies against the 
shipowner personally, [one may] amend the summons to join [the shipowner] in terms of rule 22(5) 
that the action will proceed as an action both in rem against the vessel and in personam against that 
110 
 
joinder of ‘any person against whom the party seeking the joinder has a claim whether or not 
the claim is a maritime claim and notwithstanding that the person is not otherwise amenable 
to jurisdiction of the court, whether by virtue of the absence of attachment of his property or 
otherwise.’137 It must be noted that a third party peregrinus will be made amenable to the 
court’s jurisdiction in the case of an attachment,138 this is permissible in order to effect the 
joinder of the third party.139 Provision for the joinder in terms of the Act seeks to avoid 
multiple proceedings.140 Section 3(4)(a) is specifically stated to be without prejudice to the 
rules on joinder.141  Although as far as I am aware the provisions of section 5(1) have not 
been applied in this scenario,142 it has been utilised before in admiralty cases.143  
Finally, we look at the position if South African Courts were to adopt the current position 
taken by Canadian maritime law in identifying the carrier under a bill of lading and the 
consequences that will flow to a cargo interest seeking to institute an action in rem against a 
shipowner for the loss of or damage to cargo. The decision by Nadon J in Union Carbide144 
stands as the current position followed by Canadian Courts despite critiques by scholars 
surrounding the judgement. In that case, Nadon J held that where the carrying vessel is under 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
person…Alternatively a separate action in personam can be commenced on the basis of the 
submission to the court’s jurisdiction.” 
See also Northern Endeavour Shipping Pte Ltd v Owners of NYK Isabel & Another 2017 (1) SA 25 (SCA) at 22 
para 38. 
137
 Section 5(1) of AJRA. 
138
 Hofmeyr (note 115 above; 212).  
139
 Hofmeyr (note 115 above; 212). 
140
 Hofmeyr (note 115 above; 212). 
141
 Section 3(4)(a) of AJRA states: 
(4) Without prejudice to any other remedy that may be available to a claimant or to the rules relating 
to the joinder of causes of action a maritime claim may be enforced by an action in rem – 
(a) if the claimant has a maritime lien over the property to be arrested; or 
142
 MV 'PrivGulf' v ING Bank N.V and Others (A72/2015) [2016] ZAKZDHC 23 confirmed section 5(1) of AJRA to 
be wide in scope permitting the joinder of an alternative defendant which envisages the scenario at hand. 
143
 MY ‘Summit One’ 2005(1) SA 428 at 438-439 para 17 where the question of whether section 5(1) allows the 
joinder of a defendant in the alternative. Scott JA held that: 
“because no express reference is made to a defendant in the alternative does not mean that the 
joinder of such a party is precluded. The section permits, for example, the joinder of a person ‘in 
respect of whom any question or issue which has arisen or will arise between the party [seeking the 
joinder] and the person to be joined…’ There is furthermore nothing in the section to indicate an 
intention to preclude the joinder of a person on the ground that to do so may result in a party over 
whom the Court would not otherwise have had jurisdiction possibly being found to be the only party 
liable… In the circumstances, I can see no reason for construing s 5(1) so as not to include the joinder 
of an alternative defendant. Admittedly, the powers of joinder in terms of the section so construed 
are far-reaching. But the object of the Legislature was clearly to permit all the parties to a dispute to 
be joined in action.” 
See also The Tigr 1998 (3) SA 861 (SCA). 
144
 Union Carbide (1998) 131 F.T.R. 241, 1998 AMC 429 (Fed. C. Can.). 
111 
 
time charterparty, the shipowner will be the carrier.145 It is only where the charterer expressly 
undertakes to carry the goods, that the charterer will be held to be the carrier.146 This will be 
the position despite the inclusion of a demise clause in the bill of lading.147 
It is then likely that cargo interests seeking to pursue an action in rem based on a maritime 
claim against a shipowner may find solace in the principle set out in Union Carbide.148 Since 
the existence of the demise clause in a bill of lading plays no role in identifying the carrier in 
terms of Nadon J’s decision;149 and since it is the general presumption that in the case of a 
time charterparty, the shipowner will be the carrier unless the charterer expressly undertakes 
to carry the goods;150 the action in rem may be pursued by a claimant with less difficulty. A 
claimant may enforce a maritime claim by way of an action in rem where the shipowner 
would be personally liable to the claimant in respect of the maritime claim.151 If the general 
presumption is followed in determining the carrier, then the claimant will satisfy the 
requirement of section 3(4)(b) of AJRA, since the shipowner would be found personally 
liable to the cargo interest as cargo carrier in respect of loss or damage to cargo.152 
 
6.6.  Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to analyse the interpretive approaches to contractual 
documents adopted in judicial processes. The iterative/unitary approach adopted by South 
African Courts provide that the context and background of the document together with the 
Constitution; play a significant role in the interpretive process. 
Following the unitary approach taken by South African law, it is likely that South African 
Courts would take a commercial practicable view to the interpretation of bills of lading. 
Should our courts be faced with the issue of interpreting a bill of lading containing a demise 
clause in order to identify the contractual carrier, it is respectively submitted that our courts 
would likely adhere to the judicial reasoning of English Courts on the matter. This is so also 
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because English contract law has influenced South African law due to England’s abundance 
of commercial activity, and the reputation of English contract law as to certainty.153 
This chapter also discussed the effects of identifying the carrier under a bill of lading for a 
claimant seeking to enforce a maritime claim by way of the action in rem. The chapter 
examined the procedure for the action in rem under AJRA and in so doing, also looked at the 
action in personam and joinder provisions under the Act. An integral requirement for 
enforcing a maritime claim by way of an action in rem is to establish personal liability on the 
part of the shipowner. As such, uncertainty in identifying the contractual carrier under a bill 
of lading can create challenges for a cargo interest seeking to identify the correct defendant to 
a cargo claim. Therefore, the chapter undertook a hypothesis proposing the probable 
outcomes were the current English law position, American law position and Canadian law 
position to be adopted in a South African Court confronted with the issue of identifying the 
carrier under a bill of lading containing a demise clause and/or identity of carrier clause. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion  
 
7.1.  Introduction 
The Hague and Hague-Visby Rules have possessed dominance amongst nations as the chosen 
regime in international maritime carriage.1 However the scope of the conventions have 
become outdated due to fundamental changes in the shipping trade industry.2 With the 
advancement in maritime trade, the increase in containerized transportation and the growth of 
multimodal carriage,3 the “loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody and discharge of 
goods”4 by third parties such as independent contractors have become unavoidable.5 The 
traditional concept of the “carrier” as a single carrier performing every leg of the carriage6 
provided for particularly in the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, fail to account for the 
performance of carriage by multiple subcontractors other than the contracting carrier.7 The 
multiplicity of parties to a contract of carriage has a direct bearing on the identity of carrier 
problem8 domestically and in terms of international law9 as we have discussed in chapter 
four. 
The Hamburg Rules was adopted as an attempt to update the Hague-Visby Rules in certain 
respects such as with the inclusion of the “actual carrier”10 provision. Tetley asserts that it is 
the Hamburg Rules which has settled the issue on the effect of the demise clause and identity 
of carrier clause in bills of lading,11 particularly that the role of the demise clause in a bill of 
lading is ineffective in light of Article 10 of the Hamburg Rules.12 As such, a cargo claimant 
is prevented from having to familiarise itself with all the contractual relations and terms 
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between the shipowner and charterer before instituting action for cargo loss or damage.13 
However other scholars assert that the demise clause will continue to be inserted in bills of 
lading as an effort to hold liable the shipowner or demise charterer for the carriage of goods 
and in so doing substantiating the single carrier approach adopted by most national courts.14  
 
7.2.  Summary of findings  
Chapter two examined the different indicators contained in a bill of lading in detail. It was 
stated that, the problem in identifying the carrier under a bill of lading presents itself where 
there is conflict in the various indicators stipulating who the carrier of goods is. One of the 
most controversial indicators on the bill of lading is the signature. The bill of lading may be 
signed by the master of the vessel, who binds the shipowner provided that the master signed 
within the ambit of his general authority as employee of the owner.15 The master may also 
delegate authority to charterers and agents to sign bills of lading or authority may be implied 
in terms of the charterparty.16 The Rewia17 bolted down the rule that a bill of lading signed on 
behalf of the master by charterers or sub-charterers is a shipowner’s bill unless the contract of 
carriage is made with the charterers alone.18 A bill of lading on the charterer’s form, signed in 
the charterer’s own name or logo, “for and on behalf of the charterers”19 will constitute a 
charterer’s bill. However, even then dispute will arise where the bill contains a demise clause 
or an identity of carrier clause.  
Therefore in each case, the court taking into account the documents and whole circumstances 
of each case, must determine whether the contract of carriage is made with the charterers or 
the shipowners.20 
The heading of the bill is another indicator that may assist in identifying the carrier. As was 
pointed out in The Starsin,21 “[a] shipper would… look at the face of the bill to see [which] 
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person was described as the carrier.”22 However, the heading of the bill will not be conclusive 
where ambiguity occurs with other indicators on the bill. 
Another controversial issue discussed in Chapter two is the question of having more than one 
carrier to a contract of carriage. The term “carrier” under the Hague-Visby Rules provides a 
general definition not clearly indicating if there may be more than one carrier.23 Additionally, 
the definition is not extensive enough to include another party that a carrier may appoint to 
“handle” the cargo.24 While the Hague-Visby Rules presuppose the shipowner to be the 
carrier25 in provisions such as Article 3(1)(a),26 other provisions such as Article 3(2)27 are less 
clear.28 
Contrastingly, the Hamburg Rules make a distinction between the ‘carrier’ and the ‘actual 
carrier.’ The actual carrier being the one responsible for performance of the carriage of 
goods.29 The Rules govern the responsibility of the actual carrier in respect of the carriage he 
actually performed, and provide for joint and several liability of both the contracting carrier 
and the actual carrier where their obligations overlap.30 As such, a cargo interest may claim 
from either the contracting carrier or the actual carrier in terms of Article 10(4).31 However, 
unlike the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules make no express provision for the duty of 
“due diligence” on the part of the shipowner to make the ship seaworthy, therefore where a 
demise charterer issues a bill of lading and a time charterer performs the actual carriage,32  
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the question is whether the shipowner would have any responsibilities applicable to him 
under the Rules enabling him to be identified as an actual carrier.33 
The second chapter also examined the question of whether the demise clause and identity of 
carrier clause is used as a mechanism by the charterer to avoid liability as a cargo carrier in 
contravention of Article 3(8) of the Hague-Visby Rules. According to Tetley, the demise 
clause is said to circumvent the liability of the carrier by allowing the carrier to deny that it is 
the contracting carrier,34 and to assert rather that it acts only as agent for the shipowner.35 
Tetley asserts strongly that the demise clause ought to be rendered null and void as it amounts 
to “illegal attempts by charterers to limit or exclude their liability contrary to the Rules.”36 
Chapter three of this paper examined the applicability or effectiveness or lack thereof of the 
demise clause under a bill of lading in identifying the carrier to a shipment of cargo under 
English law. Traditionally, English Courts have viewed the demise clause and identity of 
carrier clause as reliable indicators in identifying the contracting carrier,37 a case in point is 
The Berkshire.38 The court held the demise clause to be “entirely usual and ordinary”39 in 
bills of lading reinforcing the charterparty provision that allows charterers and agents to sign 
bills on the shipowner’s behalf.40 The qualification “for the master”41 did not appear with the 
signature on the bill.42  This judgement also brought clarity as far as issues of authority for 
charterers and sub-charterers to sign bills of lading are concerned.43 The case gave 
precedence to the demise clause over other provisions in the bill of lading leading to the 
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 Comparison between Article 3(1)(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules obliging the carrier to exercise due diligence 
with Article 5 of the Hamburg Rules which provides a general basis for liability. 
 
 
Article 3(1)(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules provides that: 
1. The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence to: 
(a) Make the ship seaworthy 
Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules provides that: 
1. The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the goods, as well as from delay in 
delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took place while the goods were in 
his charge as defined in article 4, unless the carrier proves that he, his servants or agents took all 
measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences. 
34
  N Gaskell…et al Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts 1 ed (2000) 105. 
35
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40
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 P Todd Principles of the Carriage of Goods by Sea 1 ed (2015) 300.  
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shipowner being the carrier. The Venezuela44 adopted a similar stance to that of The 
Berkshire,45 but placed greater emphasis on the construction of a bill of lading as a whole; 
considering all surrounding factors.46 
Contrastingly, the court in The Rewia47 reasoned that the “key words”48 “For the master”49 in 
the bill of lading indicated that the bill signed was binding on the shipowners.50 The court 
held that in identifying the contracting carrier, greater weight must be afforded to the 
signature and its qualification rather than to other provisions on the bill such as a definitions 
clause, demise clause and/or identity of carrier clause.51 
The Flecha52 however,  found the signature on bills of lading not to be a decisive factor when 
identifying the carrier, but rather that the bills must be construed in a wider context so as to 
determine the intention of the parties.53 The signatures by the charterers were not sufficient to 
prove that the charterers were the contracting carrier.54 The court held that the demise clause 
supported the fact that under a time charterparty, the charterer is entitled to sign bills of 
lading on the shipowner’s behalf thereby binding the shipowner.55 
Finally, it was the House of Lords in The Starsin56 that undertook a commercial approach in 
construing a bill of lading.57 The court viewed the bill of lading as a commercial document;58 
and the issue of identifying the carrier as one requiring the contractual interpretation of such 
commercial document.59 The House of Lords strongly adhered to the dictates of business 
sense and common commercial sense in their judgements.60 The court found that greater 
weight must be given to terms of a contract specifically elected by the parties rather than to 
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standard pre-printed provisions on the bill.61 It was held that the signature box is filled in with 
written, typed or stamped words while the demise clause constitutes a pre-printed clause on 
the bill of lading.62  
The fourth chapter of this paper provided an examination on the lack of uniformity within 
American Courts with respect to the validity of the demise clause contained in bills of lading. 
The chapter also dealt extensively with the proposition of joint and several liability of parties 
as a means to properly identifying the carrier of goods. The demise clause found successful 
validation in earlier cases such as The Iristo,63 which followed almost a decade of approval 
within American Courts.64 However, some later decisions invalidated the demise clause as a 
provision in contravention of statutory law,65 essentially as an attempt to relieve or lessen a 
carrier’s COGSA liability for loss or damage to goods.66 The outcome was that American 
Courts have seen an increasing lack of uniformity in decisions relating to the applicability 
and validity of the demise clause in bills of lading.  
However, American Courts have manoeuvred around the issue of identifying the carrier 
under a bill of lading containing a demise clause by adopting the view that there may be more 
than one carrier to a contract of carriage. The contentious ‘multicarrier approach’ is in 
keeping with Professor Tetley’s ‘joint venture’ theory between shipowners and charterers. In 
terms of the multicarrier approach, the issuing of the bill of lading and the authority to sign 
the bill are not decisive factors in determining the carrier, but rather all parties involved in the 
carriage of goods can be found to be carriers. While this approach has been applied 
expansively in the lower courts, the Courts of Appeal have cautiously applied it within the 
ambit of the requirement of privity of contract.  
In Chapter five, an examination of the traditional and current approaches taken by Canadian 
maritime law regarding the validity and effectiveness of the demise clause was undertaken. 
The chapter also dealt significantly with the current approach held by Canadian Courts 
regarding joint and several liability of both shipowner and charterer as carrier under a 
contract of carriage.   
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Early Canadian judgments such as The Mica67 and Carling O’Keefe Breweries v. C.N. 
Marine68 invalidated the demise clause under a bill of lading for its inconsistency with Article 
3(8) of the Hague-Visby Rules, which prohibits any clause seeking to relieve or lessen 
liability on the part of the carrier. Additionally, the court in Carling O’Keefe Breweries v. 
C.N. Marine69 rejected the multicarrier approach as being contrary to the definition of 
carrier70 under the Hague-Visby Rules which provide for only one carrier to a contract of 
carriage.  
However, a few years later, Canadian judgements posited approval to the notion of a joint 
venture between shipowners and time charterers. The court in the Lara S71 found it fitting to 
hold both shipowner and charterer liable as carrier under a time charterparty. In this case, the 
court also disregarded the demise clause contained in the bill of lading.  
However, the endorsement of joint and several liability between shipowners and charterers 
did not maintain its status in Canadian Courts. Later judgements such as Union Carbide 
Corp. v. Fednav Ltd,72 and Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A73 found the joint venture 
theory to be unsound and applicable only where the shipowner and charterer have agreed to 
form and carry out a partnership in the carriage of goods. Regarding the demise clause, the 
court found in Union Carbide Corp. v. Fednav Ltd74 that in spite of the inclusion of a demise 
clause under a bill of lading, where a bill is signed on behalf of the master, the bill binds the 
shipowner to the contract of carriage and the shipowner will be the carrier. The time charterer 
will be the carrier only where the charterer expressly undertakes to carry the goods. However, 
in Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A,75 the court upheld the demise clause finding that it 
evidences a contract of carriage between the shipowner and cargo interests. This case has 
effectively led to the current validation of the demise clause in identifying the carrier under 
Canadian maritime law.  
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The sixth chapter undertook an analysis of contractual interpretation. The chapter examined 
the objective approach to contractual interpretation adopted in the United Kingdom and the 
effects resultant on third parties relying on a contractual document. In The Starsin,76 in which 
case there was a third party reliance on the contractual document being the bill of lading, 
Lord Hoffman broadened the objective interpretive process by noting that the bill of lading 
evidences the contract of carriage and also constitutes a document of title that may be 
transferred to third parties or may act as security.77 The reasonable reader of the bill will 
know that such bill is addressed not only to the contractual parties but to “a potentially wide 
class of third parties.”78 
Another important aspect dealt with in the chapter is that of the role of ‘commercial common 
sense’ in contractual interpretation. Commercial common sense forms part of the criterion 
used in the objective approach to contractual interpretation in ascertaining the meaning of a 
contractual document. However, commercial common sense should not be viewed as 
overriding the significance of the language of the document, as such, courts are to guard 
against rewriting the language to suit their own notions of commercial and business sense.79 
The chapter also examined the development of contractual interpretation in South African 
law. Traditionally, the South African approach to contractual interpretation involved an 
objective enquiry of “the external manifestation of the minds of the parties rather than their 
subjective intentions.”80 However an examination of the intention of the parties is 
problematic since the parties’ contractual objectives stem from the language and words of 
lawyers in contractual negotiations.81 As such, the judgement in Natal Joint Municipal 
Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality82 set forth in clear terms the new interpretive process 
of written documents in South African law known as the ‘unitary’ or ‘iterative’83 approach.84 
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This current approach gives language and grammar equal footing as background and 
context,85 “neither predominating over the other.”86  
Lastly, chapter six deals with the effects of identifying the carrier under a bill of lading for a 
claimant seeking to enforce a maritime claim by way of the action in rem and/or action in 
personam. The conflicting judgements of the various courts in the United Kingdom, the 
United States of America as well as in Canada as discussed in previous chapters present great 
difficulty in establishing the correct defendant to a cargo claim, that is, whether the carrier of 
the cargo is the shipowner or the time charterer. The chapter examines the scenario and 
possible outcomes if the English position, the American position as well as the Canadian 
position for determining the contractual carrier had to be adopted in South African Courts, 
where a demise clause is contained in the bill of lading which conflicts with other indicators 
on the bill.  
 
7.3.  Conclusion 
It is clear that current international rules, judicial decisions and domestic legislation have 
proved to be inadequate in solving the identity of carrier issue, particularly where a demise 
clause/identity of carrier clause is contained in the bill of lading.87 It is to this end that it is 
respectfully submitted that the multicarrier approach; if adopted cautiously within the 
constraints of contractual interpretation of bills; may bring clarity on the identity of the 
carrier question.  
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